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AIM, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
0 1 . AIM AND SCOPE 
The present work displays in the form of an 
annotated bibliography and assembles together all the 
relevant literature dealing with Indo-China relations 
with special emphasis on the decades long border dispute 
between India and China. Although, the bibliography is 
selective in nature but an exaustive attempt has also 
been made to cover all important aspects of Indo-China 
relations. 
I am confident that the bibliography will be 
useful to all those who have some interest in 
International Affairs, Strategic Studies and specially in 
the field of International Disputes. The present work is 
intended to help a researcher in finding out and 
selecting the documents on the topic concerned in order 
to relieve the burden and save the time consumed in the 
document search. 
The work includes selected annotated bibliography 
of 202 original articles published in 44 reputed journals 
and periodicals from India as well as abroad since 1985. 
lY 
02. METHODOLOGY : 
In order to complete this task primary sources as 
well as other materials on Indo-China relations, 
published in various periodicals, available in a few 
libraries at Delhi and AMU, Aligarh, have been used. 
I collected most of the material from the Maulana 
Azad Library, and the Departmental Library of the Centre 
for Strategic Studies at A.M.U., Aligarh. Remaining 
material is collected from the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses Library and the Indian Council of 
World Affairs Library, Sapru House, New Delhi, 
021. STANDARD FOLLOWED : 
The Indian Standard recommendations for 
bibliographied references (IS:238/-1963) and classified 
catalogue code (C.C.C. 5th edition) of Dr. S.R. 
Ranganathan have been followed. In certain cases, where 
the said standard become unhelpful I have preferred my 
own judgement as a last resort. 
022. SUBJECT HEADING 
An attempt has been made to give coextensive 
subject headings which are arranged alphabetically letter 
by letter. SEARS LIST OF Subject Headings and Library of 
Congress List of Subject Headings have also been used. 
023. ARRANGEMENT 
The entries in this bibliography are arranged 
strictly under subject headings alphabedically letter by 
letter. 
The entry element of author is in capital letters 
followed by secondary element in parenthesis using 
capital and small letters and then the title of the 
article, subtitle if any then name of the periodical in 
CcmtroC^ ci form on the basis of C.C.C. being underlined, 
followed by volume number, issue number, the year, month, 
date, pages by using inclusive notation in the case of 
periodicals followed by an indicative abstract. 
Entries of periodicals are arranged as follows : 
1. Serial number followed by dot 
2. Name of author/authors 
3. A full stop 
4. Title of contribution of article including subtitle 
and alternate titles (if any). 
5. A full stop 
6. Contracted form of the periodical underscored. 
Yl 
8. Volume number 
9. A comma ( ,) 
10. Issue number 
11. Semi colon ( ;) 
12. Year 
13. A comma 
14. Month 
15. A comma 
16. Date (if given) 
17. Semi colon ( ; ) 
18. Pages in inclusive notation 
19. A full stop. 
0231. SAMPLE ENTRY 
118. SHRI PRAKASH. Sino-Indian relations: Perspective 
for future. Mainstream. 28, 30; 1990, May, 19; 11-13. 
EXPLANATION 
This article is taken from Mainstream which is 
titled "Sino-Indian relations: Perspective for future", 
written by Shri Pral^ sh in the 28th volume of the issue 
number 30 of the year 1990 on the pages 11 to 13; Against 
this entry the serial number is given which is 118. 
PART OM£ 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of scientific and technological 
development the world has literally shrunk. As a 
consequence events in one part of the world have an 
immediate impact on the rest of the world. Motivated 
by this, the states maintain regular relations with 
other states. Hence, the study of international 
relations has received great importance. 
The international relations has been used to 
define the official relations between the sovereign 
states. However, some scholars even include the 
economic, social and cultural relations among the 
states also within the purview of the subject. 
Thus, it can be said that International 
relations do not cover only the official relations 
conducted by the authorised leaders of the state, 
but they also cover the relations conducted by other 
important groups, which to the extent Influence the 
Interactions of the sovewreign states. Although, 
various important groups other than authorised 
officials exercise a vital Influence on the actions 
of the sovereign states as well as their mutual 
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relations, the official relations conducted by the 
sovereign states still remain the most important 
subject - matter of international relations. 
A comprehensive view of the retrospect of the 
Indo-China foreign affairs is a must to understand 
the major developments which have a direct or 
indirect impact on the Indo-China foreign relations 
since 1985. 
In the following few pages the retrospect of 
the foreign relations between India and China till 
the recent past has been given. 
INDO-CHINA RELATIONS 
Sino-Indian friendship was one of the main 
planks of Nehru's foreign policy. In a B.B.C. 
broadeast in December, 1949, Prime Ministewr 
Jawaharlal Nehru declared : "we in India have had 
2,000 years of friendship with China. We have 
differences of opinion and even small conflicts but 
when we hearken back to that long past some thing of 
the wisdom of that past helps us to understand each 
other". This was the attitude of Nehru. 
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"A powerful neighbour is a potential enemy" 
is a saying as old as Kautilya. But the leaders of 
India as well as communist China developed sympathies 
between them, having suffered a common experience of 
white colonialism for more than a century, despite 
their divergent ideologies. Even in the context of 
the decision of Communist China to establish its 
hegemony over Tibet in the autumn of 1959, - although 
Tibet had enjoyed the status of a buffer-state 
between British India and China for about forty years 
- Nehru accepted the change gracefully in the context 
of the new balance of power in Asia, when China had 
proved army under U.N. flag in the battlefield of 
Korea. 
A LEGACY OF FRIENDSHIP ; 
India and China have maintained close 
relations since ancient times. The foundation for 
these relations was laid by the Budhlst preachers who 
went to China and expressed and spread this religion 
through the whole country. A large number of Chinese 
Budhlst scholars came to India in search of 
knowledge. Similarly Chinese students also came to 
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India in search of knowledge. Similarly Chinese 
students also came to India to study at universities 
like Nalanda. 
In the modern times India expressed full 
sympathy for China when she was subjected to Japanese 
aggression After independence the two countries 
could not develop intimate relations on account of 
pre-occupation with their respective problems. 
However, with the emergence of the People's Republic 
of China the relations between the two country 
started improving as India was the first country to 
recognise the communist regime in china. She was also 
enthusiastic about the entry of Red China in the 
United nations. India consistently supported the case 
of China's entry into the United Nations. India 
showed keenness to develop friendly relations 
with China despite its military action in Tibet and 
avoided raising the issue at the international forum. 
PANCH SHEEL : 
In 1954 India concluded a treaty with China 
with regard to Tibet and recognised Tibet as region 
of China. This treaty is known as Panchsheet, which 
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also expressed the determination of the two countries 
to conduct their relations on the basis of five 
principles (Panch sheel), viz., mutual respect for 
each othewr's territorial integrity and sovereignity; 
non-aggression; non-intervention in each other's 
domestic affairs; mutual benefit and equality; and 
peaceful coexistence. 
The relations between the two countries 
continued to be very friendly for sometime and the 
two cooperated at the Bandung Conference of 
Afro-Asian Nations. China also supported India on the 
issue of Goa. In 1950, when hostilities brokeout 
between Tibetans and the Chinese forces India 
refrained from intervening in the matter. As a result 
Tibet lost her autonomy. 
TIBET ISSUE : 
India was the first country to recognize the 
Communist rglme in China. She was also enthusiastic 
about the entry of Red China in the United Nations. 
During the Korean War when China entered the war on 
the side of North Korea, the sympathies of the people 
of India were on the side of Red China. After their 
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success in the Korean war, the Chinese began to talk 
of liberating Tibet. 
The Government of India adopted a temperate 
but firm line. It asked the Chinese to settle the 
matter with the Tibetans by peaceful negotiatins. For 
many months, the Tibetan Government bad 
unsuccessfully tried to make diplomatic contact with 
Peking in order to negotiate peaceful settlement. The 
arrival of the first Chinese Communist Ambassador to 
India in August 1950 provided the Tibetans with an 
opportunity and in September 1950 a seven man Tibetan 
delegation, that had been waiting at Kalimpong, got 
in touch with the Chinese envoy. The talks failed and 
Peking demanded that the delegation must come to the 
Chinese capital. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining 
visas for Hong Kong and also owing to the 
inexperience of the Tibetan delegation, there was 
considerable delay in their departure. Peking 
attributed this to hostile foreign intrigue and 
interference. On 25 October 1950, the delegation left 
Delhi and almost simultaneously came the news that 
"People's army units have been ordered to advance 
into Tibet". 
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India protested strongly. In a note dated 26 
October 1950, addressed to the Foreign Minister of 
Communist China, the Government of India declared: 
"In the present context of world events, the invasion 
by Chinese troops on Tibet cannot but be regarded as 
deplorable and in the considered judgement of the 
Government of India not in the interest of China or 
of peace. Government of India can only expess their 
deep regret that in spite of friendly and 
disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the 
Chinese Government should have decided to seek a 
solution of the problem of their relations with Tibet 
by force instead by the slower and more enduring 
method of peaceful approach." Peking reacted sharply 
and asked India to mind her own business. The 
Communist Government made it clear that Tibet was an 
integral part of the Chinese territory and the 
problem of Tibet was entirely a domestic problem of 
China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must 
enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend 
the frontiers of China. China made in clear that no 
foreign interference shall be tolerated. It was also 
alleged that the Indian Government had been 
influenced in its views by "foreign influences 
hostile to China in Tibet". India repudiated the 
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aallegations but took no effective steps to stop the 
allegations but took no effective steps to stop the 
march of the Chinese armies into Tibet and 
consequently the Tibetans were left alone to their 
fate. 
Diplomatic Defeat 
The occupation of Tibet by China was a 
diplomatic defeat for India. For centuries, Tibet had 
served as a buffer state between India and China and 
after the occupation of Tibet, the borders of China 
reached the borders of India. About Chinese 
occupation of Tibet and India's attitude towards it, 
Jai Prakash Narain says: "it is true that we could 
not have prevented the Chinese from annexing Tibet. 
But we could have saved ourselves from being party to 
a wrong". The Chinese occupation of Tibet endangered 
the safety of India. Tibet is now the base from which 
the Chinese armies operate against India. Tibet is 
the palm of the hand and now that the Chinese have 
it, they want the five fingers without which the palm 
is useless. The five fingers are Ladakh, Nepal, 
Sikkim, Bhutan and the North East Frontier Agency". 
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BORDER DISPUTE 
As In 1950 India stopped herself from 
intervening in the matter of Tibetan revolt and the 
suppressive operations of Chinese forces, Tibet lost 
her autonomy. At this juncture, China also started 
making incursions into Indian territory and built a 
road across Aksaichin. In 1959, the Chinese Prime 
Minister raised a doubt about the established 
boundaries between the two countries and put forward 
a claim of 53,000 square miles of Indian territory. 
For the next few years there were numerous incidents 
on the border. 
The frontiers of India and China are about 
2,640 miles and they include the boundaries of Sikkim 
and Bhutan with Tibet because the external relations 
and defence of these States are a part of India's 
responsibility. This long boundary has three 
divisions, viz., the Western, Middle and Eastern 
Sectors. The Western Sector begins at the 
tri-junction where the boundaries of India, China and 
Afghanistan meet. It ends in the region where the 
Indian States of Kashmir, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh 
form a common boundary with Tibet. From here starts 
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the middle sector which ends at the tri-junction of 
Uttar Pradesh, Nepal and Tibet. Then starts the 
boundary of Nepal with Tibet. Where it ends at the 
tri-junction of Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet, there starts 
the Eastern Sector which covers Sikkim, Bhutan and 
NEFA frontiers with Tibet. The Sector ends at the 
tri-junction of the NEFA, Tibet and Burma boundaries. 
The line which divides NEFA, from its junction with 
Bhutan up to the point where it meets the Burma 
border is known as the McMathon Line. This line was 
accepted by the representatives of the Government of 
India, Tibet and China in a Conference at Simla in 
1913-14. This frontier was accepted through 
tradition, custom and administrative convenience by 
all the three countries concerned. 
Direct access to Tibet is easy from the East 
but the roads through it have to pass through a vewry 
difficult terrain. There is also the danger of 
attacks from the Khampas. The Southern roads pass 
through Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and India and are not 
available to China. The major trade route from the 
North-VJest goes to Leh, capital of Ladakh which is a 
part of Indian territory. The alternative for China 
was to build a major highway over the Aksai Chin 
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Plateau in the Indian region of Ladakh. 'The road 
that the Chinese first built in 1956-57 across Ladakh 
was important to the maintenance of their control 
over Tibet. Without such a supply route, the 
officially acknowledged Khampa revolt in Eastern 
Tibet might have reached disastrous proportions.... 
It soon gained the status of a major road, connecting 
Yarkand and Khotan with Rudok, Gartok and finally 
Taklakot, a trade and agricultural centre of long 
recognized strategic interest just North of the point 
where the borders of Tibet, Nepal and India meet". 
During the days of India's friendship with 
China, this road was completed by China without any 
opposition and by 1958 China occupied over 6,000 sq. 
miles of Indian territory. 
There were many violations of the Indian 
border by the Chinese from time to time. On 27 
September, 1958, a group of 51 Chinese troops crossed 
into the Lohit Frontier of NEFA. On 7 August, 1959, 
another Chinese patrol crossed the Indian border at 
Khinzemane in NEFA. Another incursion took place at 
Longju. The Indian detachment had to retire and the 
Chinese forces occupied the Longju Post. Later on, 
the Chinese withdraw from this post on account of the 
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outbreak of an epidemic. On 6 October, 1959, the 
Chinese ambushed a party of 19 Indians in Ladakh and 
killed 16 of them. 
On 9 November, 1959, Chou En-lai proposed a 
withdrawal of troops by both sides \2\ miles on each 
side of the positions held by both the countries at 
that time and also urged early talks to discuss the 
border issue. On 18 December, 1959, he rejected the 
Indian proposal for the neutralisation of the 
disputed areas in Ladakh. However, he accepted the 
proposal for neutralisdation of Longju. He rejected 
the Indian proposal that in Ladakh, the Chinese 
should withdraw their civil and military forces to 
the East of the Indian border and India in turn 
should withdraw to the west of the line claimed as 
international frontier in the Chinese maps of 1956. 
Chou-En-Iai, on his part, proposed the neutralisation 
of Khinzempane, Lapthal, Nilang, Shipki Pass, 
Demchok, Chura and Chuje. That proposal was rejected 
by India. 
In March 1960, a meeting was held at New 
Delhi and it was attended by Chou En-lai. China 
wanted to strile a barter deal. She was prepared to 
Eastern Sector if India recognised China's claim in 
the Ladakh area. The suggestion was not accepted by 
India. It was decided to set up a committee of 
officials of both the countries to investigate the 
claims of each side and to submit a report by 
September, 1960. However, nothing came out of the 
report of the Committee and China continued to occupy 
large chunks of Indian territory. It appears that 
Indian Government did not attach due importane to the 
Chinese activities. It was foolishly maintained that 
the areas occupied by the Chinese consisted of 
"barren mountain tops where not even a blade of grass 
grows". China claimed about 15,000 sq. miles of 
territory in Ladakh and NEFA. She also claimed 
longju, Khinzemane, Spiti, Shipki, Nilang, Jodhang, 
Lapthal and Barahoti. She also claimed about 2,000 
sq. miles of the territory of Bhutan and put forward 
her claim to negotiate directly with Bhutan. 
It is true that there had been Chinese 
intrusions from time to time but the relations 
between India and China got very much strained after 
India gave political asylum to Dalai Lama. It was 
considered to be an affront by China and the Chinese 
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attltude towards India became very aggressive. When 
the attention of China was drawn to the activities of 
guard units, Chou En-lai wrote thus to Nehru: "I can 
assurew your Excellency that it is merely for 
preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing 
the border back and forth to carry out harassing 
activities that the Chinese Government in recent 
months despatched guard units to be stationed in the 
south-eastern part of Tibet region of China. This is 
obviously in the interest of ensuring the 
tranquillity of the border and will in no way 
constitute a threat to India". 
In 1961, war clouds began to gather over 
Ladakh and NEFA. In April 1961, the Chinese intruded 
into Sikkim, in May into the Chushul area of Ladakh 
and in July into the Kameng Division of NEFA. In 
August, 1961, the Chinese intruded into Ladakh once 
again and established three checkposts, one at Nyagzu 
and two near Danbuguru. In January, 1962, the Chinese 
crossed over near Longju in NEFA. In April, May and 
June, they entered the Chip Chap and Spangur areas of 
Ladakh. In July, 1962, the Indian post in the Galwan 
valley was surrounded by the Chinese. However, they 
did not advance further as Indian army was given 
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orders to defind Itself In case of further Chinese 
advance. On 8 September, 1962, the crossed the Thagla 
Ridge and intruded into the Indian territory. On 20 
September, 1962, they again opened fire on Indian 
Guards. On 9 October, 1962, they attacked the Indian 
posts on the Indian side of the Thagla Ridge. They 
opened fire on Indian troops with 2" mortars, 
automatic weapons and hand-grenades. 
CHINESE AGGRESSION, 1962 
The things took serious turn in 1962 when 
China launched a full fledged attack on India on 20 
October, 1962, in NEFA and Ladakh and took possession 
of large chunks of Indian territory. Though 
subsequently China announed a unilateral ceasefire 
and withdrew its force from certain territories, it 
continued to be in occupation of vast traks of Indian 
territory. 
India has been insisting on the return of its 
occupied territories for all these years, but without 
any success. 
On 20 October, the Chinese started their big 
offensive. In NEFA, the strength of the attacking 
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forces reached "three division, two from the 
direction of Tawang and one Division in the direction 
of Kibithoo. To launch such an attack on such a large 
scale, one can imagine the amount of preparation they 
must have undertaken. They must have been planning this 
for a long time in considerable detail, and these 
actions in over running outpost in Dhola Bridge and in 
occupying Thagla Ridge, must have been with the 
specific aim of forcing us to react so as to give them 
a good excuse for launching an attack on us" (General 
K.S. Thimayya). They also attacked in the Chip Chap 
Valley and the Pangong Lake areas of Ladakh. In three 
days, major fighting was going on in five main areas. 
By 24 October, the Chinese were well across the 
McMahon Line through a 25-mile wide sector to a depth 
of 8 miles into the Indian territory. Kibithoo had 
fallen into the hands of the enemy. 
On 24 October, 1962, China made a peace offer. 
The terms were that the Sino-indian border question 
should be settled peacefully. Emphasis was put on the 
sanctity of the "line of actual control". It was 
suggesteds that the Prime Ministers of the two 
countries should meet and resolve the differences 
between the two countries. Chou En-lai observed; 
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What Issue is there between China and India which 
cannot be settled peacefully?... China doesn't want a 
single inch of India's territory". The reply of Nehru 
was: "There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese 
offer to withdraw 20 kilometers from what they call 
'line of actual control". What is this 'line of actual 
control'? Is this the line they have created by 
aggression since the beginning of September? Advancing 
40 or 60 kilometres by blatant military aggression and 
offering to withdraw 20 kilometres provided both sides 
do this is a deceptive device which can fool nobody." 
On 26 October, 1962, India declared a state of 
emergency. By 31 October, 1962, the Chinese had 
consolidated their positions in NEFA and were poised 
to threaten the plains of India. On that day, they 
actually launched a massive attack. Tawang fell into 
their hands. Walong, Sela and Bamdila also fell into 
their hands in quick succession. On the Ladakh front, 
Daulat Beg Oldi fell into their hands. Chushul was 
attacked and its air-port was under heavy enemy fire. 
Indian troops were entrenched in strong positions and 
put up a very gallant defence. On account of the heavy 
casualities suffered by the Chinese, they gave up the 
idea of capturing Chushul. 
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When the Government of India was under heavy 
pressure from China and there was every possibility of 
Assam failing into the hands of the Chinese, Prime 
Minister Nehru requested the United States and Great 
Britain to help him. The response was a prompt one. 
There was a constant flow of arms into India from 
various quarters. Help also came from Canada, VJest 
Germany and Australia. It was this help which enabled 
the Indian troops to stand against the Chinese and it 
v;as at this time that China declared a unilateral 
cease-fire to be effective from the midnight of 21 and 
22 November, 1962. When the cease-fire was declared, 
"the Chinese Communist armies were in possession of 
mountain gateways into the plains of Assam... were in 
command of the natural approaches through the 
mountains to the Brahmaputra valley and threatened the 
whole of Assam and its oil-fields. The entire North-
Eastern Frontier Agency area now lay under the threat 
of Chinese conquest.... The Chinese In lightning 
conquest had seized the crest lines and now controlled 
the key passes and were moving downhill towards the 
crowded plains". 
While declaring cease-fire, the Chinese 
announced that their frontier guards would withdraw to 
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position 12^ miles behind the lines of actual control 
which existed between China and India. China was to set 
up check-posts on its own side of the McMahon line to 
forestall the activities, of the suboteurs and to 
maintain order. However, on Ladakh front, the Chinese 
were still controlling about 12,000 sq. miles of Indian 
territory which included Aksai Chin area through which 
the Chinese had,built a strategic road linking Sinkiang 
with Tibet. 
Dr. Sudhir Ghosh says in "Gandhi's Emissary" that 
a special appeal by Prime Minister Nehru for American air 
protection was delivered to President Kennedy on the 
night of 19 November 1962 by Ambassador B.K. Nehru. It 
asked for 16 squadrons of fighter planes. An American 
aircraft-carrier was immediately despatched towards the 
Bay of Bengal. There were also shipments of emergency 
arms and on 21 November 1962, China announced unilateral 
ceasefire. 
As a result of the Chinese attack, the Indian 
nation was hurt, humiliated, frightened, angered and 
worried. To quote President Radhakrishnan, "The Indian 
reverses in NEFA should be regarded as a matter of 
sorrow, shame and humiliation. Such a thing should not be 
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reepated. Our army has to be reoriented and refashioned 
according to the latest canons of military science We 
have to retrieve our lost prestige". On 27 October 1962, 
Prime Minister Nehru wrote thus to Chou En-Lai: "Nothing 
in my long political career has hurt and griewed me more 
than the fact that the hopes and aspirations for peaceful 
and friendly neighbourly relations which we entertained 
and to promote which my colleagues in the Government of 
India and myself worked so hard have been shattered by 
the hostile and unfriendly twist given to India-China's 
relations during the past two years". The view of Frank 
Moraes is that if India had followed a flexible policy 
towards China on the question of border there might have 
a settlement on the lines of Burma, Nepal and Pakistan. 
However, this view is not accepted by the Chinese experts 
of the Government of India. Their contention is that 
China was determined to humble India in the eyes of the 
world and consequently there was no scope for any 
adjustment. 
Reasons for Unilateral Cease-fire : 
Many reasons have been given for the unilateral 
cease-fire by China. One view is that China withdrew on 
account of pressure from Moscow. The Soviet Union did not 
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e of Chinese aggression against India and hence China 
withdrew. Another view is that China feared an attack on 
the mainland from the National Government in Formosa. 
Another view is that there was food shortage in China and 
the Chinese Government was afraid that food supplies from 
Canada and Australia might be cut off if she continued 
her aggression against India. The world opinion was also 
against China. China had fought the war for a definite 
purpose and that was to humiliate India. That object was 
amply served by the time cease-fire was declared by 
China. China succeeded in creating an impression among 
the neighbours of India that China was a much stronger 
country than India and hence it was no use bothering 
about her. Another Important reason why China withdrew 
was that the Governments of the United States and Great 
Britain gave India military help which enabled her to put 
up stiff resistance. The military help to India was 
increasing and with that her capacity to defend herself. 
There were prospects of the war being a long one and 
hence China stopped by unilateral action. 
The War of 1962 put a very severe strain on the 
relations of India with China. The humiliation and self-
respect of India prevented her from opening a dialogue 
with China. Under Mao Tse-tung, China treated most of 
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the Indian leaders as reactionaries and was not 
interested in the improvement of relations. China was 
satisfied with the existing situation. 
It is true that China had won victories but 
it is also a fact that the main forces of the Indian army 
were never involved in the campaigns against China. 
INDIA-CHINA WAR, 1962 and SOVIET UNION 
As regards the attitude of the Soviwet Union 
towards the war between India and China, she gave India 
cautious and limited support in 1959. She asked the 
parties to come to a compromise. In 1961, it was 
announced that India had purchased Soviet transport 
planes for use in the Ladakh area and more transport 
planes and helicopters were to be purchased later. In May 
1962, the Soviet Union agreed to supply some supersonic 
MIG jets to India and to build a factory for Indian-made 
jets. When the Chinese attacks actually started, the 
Soviet Union waited silently for weeks before giving 
lukewarm support to India. On 25 October 1962, the Pravda 
and Izvestia supported Peking's demand for negotiations 
on terms unfavourable to India. Although a special emissary 
had gone from India to moscow and Warsaw, nothing 
substantial was got. The first four MIGs did not reach 
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reach Bombay till February 1963. It was only after the 
Cuban crisis was over that Khrushchev declared on 12 
December 1962 that the was between India and China 
benefited only the imperialists and weakened the 
progressive forces in India. The Soviet Union was in a 
position to put pressure on China by attacking Sinkiang 
but she did not. The Soviet Union called the Indians as 
their friends and the Chinese as their brothers. 
TND1H:HINA WAR, 1962 AND PAKISTAN 
When the war was going on between Indian and 
China, Pakistan was carrying on her border negotiations 
with China and thereby strengthening her ties with China. 
India protested against the border negotiations on the 
ground that the whole of Kashmir legally belonged to her 
and hence Pakistan had no authority to discuss questions 
relating to the occupied territory. Prime Minister Nehru 
condemned the Sino-Pak duplicity in these words: "The 
fact is that in the history of the world you will find 
vwery few examples of such deceit and duplicity as 
Pakistan has shown in siding with China in the dispute 
between India and China. It is an action singularly 
lacking in principles and can only be described as 
blackmail." 
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Iiapact of War, 1962 on India 
The Indian reverse in 1962 created an 
unfavourable Impression in Pakistan regarding India's 
capacity to fight and that led to the war between India 
and Pakistan in 1965. Pakistan felt that she could attack 
India with impunity on account of her weakness. She also 
felt attack India with impunity on account of her 
weakness. She also felt that she could rely upon China in 
her war against India. Economically, the war between 
India and China gave a setback to India was forced for 
growth and development. The Government of India was 
forces to spend a lot of money on military preparations 
and consequently less money was left for nation-building 
activities. However, China failed to crush India. India 
did not collapse. Her progress was far from crippled. 
Instead of breaking the spirit of the Indian army, the 
Chinese aroused it to a point where the recovery of 
military as well as national prestige was the foremost 
objective. The Chinese lost as much in terms of 
long-range objective as they gained in short term 
advantages. There was a worldwide sympathy for India and 
suspicion of the motives of China. India stood more 
united than ever before. 
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CHINA'S SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN AGAINST INDIA 
China not only took large portion open support to 
Pakistan in its wars against India in 1965 and 1971 as 
well. China also supplied huge quantities of arms and 
ammunition to Pakistan for use against iNDIA-
Despite these provocations, India has favoured 
negotiated settlement of the border dispute, with china 
and supported china's entry into the United Nations. 
During the war between India and Pakistan in 
September, 1965, China gave an ultimatum to India on 17 
September 1965. She demanded the removal within three 
days of certain alleged Indian defence installations on 
the Chinese side of the Sikkim border. V\fhen the ultimatum 
of 3 days expired, the same was extended by another three 
days. The ultimatum evoked a warning to China from both 
the United States and the Soviet Union against fishing in 
troubled waters. Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri 
denied and rejected the Chinese allegations but for the 
sake of peace, agreed to accept an earlier Chinese 
proposal of joint inspection of the border to check up 
the allegations. 
China denounced India as the aggressor in the war 
between India and Pakistan. Chinese complicity in the war 
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was demonstrated by the use of Chinese tanks and other 
military equipment by the Pakistan army. A number of 
Chinese T-59 tanks were captured during the war. The 
Director of Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis 
disclosed that China had supplied Pakistan infantry and 
artillery equipment for two divisions. (AK-47 riffles, 
light and medium machine-guns, 60 mm, 81 mm and 121 mm 
moirtars and 100 field guns and 225 T-59 medium tanks). 
Pakistan also received from China a squadron of IL-28 
bombers and four squandrons of MIG-19 interceptors. China 
also supplied a number of river boats and coasters after 
March 1971 to Pakistan. China blocked the entry of 
Bangladesh into the United Nations with a view to spiting 
India. 
RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
In April 1976, India and China resumed their 
diplomatic relations for the first time since 1962. The 
changes in leadership in China after the death of Chou 
En-Iai and Mao Tse-tung in 1976 and the ouster of 
Teng-Hsiao-Ping faciliated the normalisation of relations 
between the two countries. Both India and China exchanged 
ambassadors. The Christian Science Monitor wrote, "Both 
India and China have considerably to gain by improved 
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relations. A warm-up with its big southern neighbour 
could be construed as a first class gain for Peking in 
its long, bitter verbal conflict with the Soviet Union. 
From India's point of view, an Indian spokesman in Peking 
would be particularly useful in countering Pakistan which 
maintained close diplomatic relations with China." The 
comment of the BBC was that the normalisation of 
relations between India and China demonstrated greater 
wanted to strengthen her position in the non-aligned 
world on the eve of the Colombo Summit in 1976. 
In August 1977, some disputes cropped up between 
India and China on the issue of the Tibetans in India. A 
group Tibetans protested in New Delhi and demanded the 
secession of Tibet from China. China charged India that 
she was conniving at the anti Chinese activities of the 
Tibetans in India. India strongly refuted the charge and 
maintained that she was not giving any support to the 
activities of the Tibetan refugees in India. 
Trade Delegations : 
Trade delegations were exchanged in 1979 between 
the two countries. In February 1979, the Indian Foreign 
Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, paid a visit to Peking on an 
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atory mission with a view to the further normalisation of 
the bilateral relations but the Chinese invasion of 
Vietnam while Vajpayee was still in China, caused a 
serious setback to Indian efforts towards normalisation. 
India openly condemned Chinese military action against 
Vietnam. 
Since the death of mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai 
in 1976, China has refrained from indulging in 
anti-Indian propaganda and welcomed cultural, scientific 
and economic exchanges. Many delegations have gone from 
India to China and many Chinese delegations have visited 
India. These have prepared the ground for solving the 
boundary dispute between the two countries. 
China is satisfied with the present situation on 
the ground that she had secured access to Sinkiang from 
Tibet via the Aksai Chin road. India's position since the 
war has been that no negotiations were possible until she 
recovered every inch of its claimed territory occupied by 
the Chinese. 
OPENING OF KHUNJERAB PASS AND KARAKORAM HIGHWAY 
Further more, relations between India and China 
suffered a setback following the opening of the Khunjerab 
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Pass in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. This 4,620 metre 
highway was opened for regular travel and trade. India 
has been repeatedly protesting to both China and Pakistan 
over this matter since the boundary treaty and agreement 
between Pakistan and China regarding the illegally 
occupied territory of Kashmir and the construction of 
Karakaram highway by the two countries is illegal. This 
development gave a serious setback to the process of 
normalisation of relations between India and China. 
Despite the setback caused by the border dispute, 
the leaders of the two countries have often expressed 
their desire to improve relations with each other. In 
August 1984 India and China signed a trade agreement 
which included the provision of confering on each other 
most favoured nation status and to increase bilateral 
trade. However, despited these developments the border 
dispute between the two countries remained unresolved on 
account of divergent stand of the two countries. While 
China wants settlement of border along existing line of 
control, it is not acceptable to India. 
Towards the close of 1984 fresh efforts were 
began to find a solution of the border problem, but no 
solution could be arrived at. In subsequent months 
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certain events took place which generated fresh tension 
in place which generated fresh tension in Sino-Indian 
relations. These include Chinese assistance to Pakistan 
in developing nuclear weapon, intrusion of Chinese troops 
into the Indian territory, the Chinese protest over grant 
of statehood to arunachal Pradesh, which was described by 
India as interference in country's interval affairs. 
Inspite of all this India has shown keenness to 
resolve outstanding disputes with china amicably. The 
Chinese leader's also responded favourably. As a result 
several round of talks were held. But no solution could 
be found due to reluctance of China to withdraw from the 
present line of control in Ladakh unless India made 
certain concessions on the MacMohan line in the east. 
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1985 ONWARDS 
On 12 November 1984, Rajiv Gandhi, in his very 
first broadcast to the nation also indicated his 
determination to work for improvement and strengthening 
of relations with China along with other countries. 
In 1987, as a result of mutual talks the two 
countries agreed to maintain peace along the borders till 
a mutually acceptable settlement was worked out. 
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RAPPROCHEHENTS 
Rajiv Gandhi Visits Beijing : 
In December, 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
paid a visit to Beijing with a view to improve relations 
with China. As a result of the talks held at Beijing the 
two countries agreed to setup a Joint Working Group on 
Boundary Question and a Joint Group on Economic 
Relations, Trade, Science and technology. The leaders 
their desire to conduct their relations on the basis of 
the five principles of Panchsheel advocated earlier. 
During the next two years there was a distinct 
improvement in Sino-Indian relations. This change was 
reflected in China's stand on Kashmir. In December 1988 
China declared that Kashmir was a bilateral problem which 
had to be resolved through 'peaceful mutual 
consultations'. 
Li Peng Visits Delhi: 
In December 1991 the Chinese Premier paid visit 
to India after a gap of 31 years and held fruitful talks 
with the Indian counter-part. The two leaders agreed to 
maintain peace and tranquillity in the area along the 
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one of actual control pending final settlement of 
boundary question. They also concluded agreements with a 
view to expand and strengthen bilateral relations. They 
agreed to open consulates General at Bombay and Shanghai 
after a gap of 29 years. The two countries also agreed to 
cooperate in space research, technology and its 
application. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the above developments, the relations 
between the two countries are still strained. China is 
unhappy with India on account of anti-Chinese activities 
being carried on by the Tibetans from the Indian soil. 
India is unhappy with China because it has agreed to 
supply M-11 nuclear missiles to Pakistan. But the 
collapse of Soviet Union and increased hegemony of 
America, has convinced the leaders of the two countries 
that they must improve their relations in mutual 
interest. 
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Observes that the diseintegration of the 
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Pakistan's nuclear programe and the competition at 
global level for economic resources and as an economic 
power. 
, ANNIVERSARY, FORTIETH, 1990 
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relation (Editorial). Demo World. 19, 15; 1990, Apr, 15; 4. 
States that both India and China took note of 
the improving international environment on the occasion 
of the 40 anniversary of the Sino-Indian relations 
which was celebrated in a big way in both the 
countries. But, suggests that the Sino-Indian relations 
had to be viewed in the proper context as both China and 
India were victims of a legacy of the part. Also 
reflects on the adverse factors like Chinese arms aid to 
Pakistan, providing Pakistan with advanced missiles and 
helping Pakistan in manufacturing nuclear weapons which 
can not be ignored in this context. 
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005. BHARGAVA (GS). Dealings with China. Mainstream. 
27, 15; 1989, Jan, 7; 6-8. 
Discusses in detail India's foreign policy 
towards China. Exposes the ups and downs in the 
Sino-Indian relations right from the emergence of the 
peoples Republic of China. Mentions the frindly 
relations between the two countries till the termination 
of their friendly neighbourhood du to the Chinese attack 
on India in 1962. The relations remained frozen for 
three decades. Although the recent developements whow an 
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a final settlement. 
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Makes an attempt to examine Sino-Indian 
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years part. In the light of India's anti-colonial and 
anti-hegmonistic world view, third VJorld and role of 
non-alignent and emergencee of unipolar world due to 
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disintegration of the Soviet Union, observes the 
changing Sino-Indian relations. Describes also the high 
level exchange visits of the counterparts from both the 
countries, their week trade relations and the boundary 
issue that demands resolution as an essential 
pre-requisite for a complete normalisation of relations 
betv/een India and China. 
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Lain Chushul Sector, Namka Cha and the occupation of 
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implications for regional stability. 
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Delhi-Beijing dialogue. Times Ind. 1987, June, 11; 6:3. 
Discusses the circumstances in which India-
China relations needed to be repaired and improved to 
the possible extent and to put it at the very least, not 
allowed to worsen by default because if the relations 
between the two Asian giants, are bad, whole concept of 
"Asian solidarity" might become an arid one. The 
Chinese leadership was ready to respond to any Indian 
initiative for Inida-China dialogue. The efforts of Mr. 
Rajiv Gandhi to promote the discussion in this regard 
and the initiatives of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to improve 
India's relations with China, her important neighbour, 
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REGIONAL SECURITIES 
010. TALKING TO Li Peng (Editorial). Times Ind. 
1991, Nov, 29; 8:1. 
Tells that an iprovement of, bilateral 
relations was sought as eagerly by China's leadership as 
India's. This was clear from the statements ade by top 
figures, among them General Secretary jiang Zemin and 
prime minister Li Peng, that ass understanding between 
the two nations would make a major contribution to peace 
and stability in Asia. It was reasonable to assume that 
Mr. Li's visit to India in the Dec. 1991 would not lack 
this context. 
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Oil. SENGUPTA (Bhabani). Why not a treaty with 
China ? Frontline. 5, 10; 1988, May, 14-27; 26-28. 
Discovers the need to bring an agreement 
between India and China on the border issue. But brings 
into notice the obstacles too, for such a development. 
Argues that with such as achievement the reduction of 
the forces from both sides will take place along the 
common border and both the countries will be able to 
divert their expenses on developmental tasks. 
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, , MILITARY BALANCE 
012. RIKHYE (Ravi). Sino-Indian border: Military 
balance. Hind Times. 1987, May, 15; 9:7. 
Investigates into the strategic capability of 
India and China relating to the quantity as well as 
quality of the military personnels, on the each side, 
their efficiency in adverse weathers during winter and 
monsoon, their technological capacity in war-fare, the 
quality of their fighter aircrafts and the unfavourable 
geographical factor to one and favourable for the other. 
If one is superior in one respect, it is nullified by 
its inferiority at the other. Admits, there is simply 
point in assessing the superiority of one over the 
other. 
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013. HIMALAYAN DAWN (Editorial). Times Ind. 1990, 
Feb, 2; 6:1. 
Tells that the most striking indicator of the 
improvement in Sino-Indian relations, since Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi's visit to Beijing in Dec. 1988, was the 
agreement reached to cut fences facing each other, 
particularly in the North-East. Observes that a major 
outcome was the mutual reduction of troops along its 
most sensitive, border, namely the one with the Soviet 
Union. On India's part also, the reduction of forces in 
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the Himalayas was very much in favour of a new trend in 
the sino-Indian relations. 
, BORDER TALKS, REDUCTION OF FORCES 
014. FOR A peaceful border (Editorial). Tites Ind. 
1989, Oct, 5; 8:1. 
Revealsthal New Delhi and Beijing were 
signifying their intent to put the part behind them 
during the forthcomming visit of Mr. Wue Xueqian to New 
Delhi. Since conflicting claims make it difficult to 
resolve the prolonged border dispute, the only sensible 
option remains is to create a frame work of arrangements 
to defuse tensions. Suggests, the potential for creating 
mutual under standing is fuelled by keeping the border 
move or less incident-free. 
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FRONTIER 
015. VOHRA (Sahder). North-Eastern frontier of India 
and China's claim. Stra Analysis. 12, 9; 1989, Dec; 
931-48. 
Discusses the China's claim on the 
north-eastern frontier of India, in detail. Exposes that 
China has laid claim to the area of Arunachal Pradesh, 
north of the Brahmaputra river. While the Chinese, admit 
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that there is a natural, customary, traditional boundary 
between India and Tebet, they assert that it lies, not 
along the main Himalayan crest, but along the right bank 
of the Brahmaputra. Observes that the Chinese claim to 
the area has no support in history and it is without any 
substances. 
, , CHINESE PERCEPTION 
016. KLINTWORTH (Gary). Chinese perspectives on 
India as a great power. Link. 35,12; 1992, Nov, 1; 
25-29. 
Analyses that although, China has been 
perceiving a threat from its Himalayan neighbour (i.e. 
India) for decades, its overall perception of India has 
under gone changes in recent years, particularly on the 
sensitive border question. But in the longer run 
competition between China and India for regional 
political influence is a distinct possibility. 
, , CHINESE TACTICS 
017. DALJIT SINGH. Chinese game on the border, Ind 
Exp. 1989, Oct, 20; 8:7. 
Mentions that the Sino-Indian working Group 
setup after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in Dec. 1988 
was reported to have discussed the redeployment of 
troops on the border "to give a positive thrust to 
bilateral relations". Investigates, why this 
redeployment ? Opines that this was a subtle move by 
China to gain on advantageous position all along the 
border with an eye on a future conflict. Probes into 
various tactics adopted by China on the border issue. 
, , CHINESE VIEW 
018. HUI (Jing). Truth about the Eastern Sector of 
the China-India boundary. China Rep. 25, 1; 1989, 
Jan-Mar; 99-112. 
Exposes that the greatest controversy of the 
China-Indian border issue is over the eastern sector of 
the border. Chinese view is that the illegal 'McMahon 
Line' was merely a product of Britain's aggressive 
policy and the area between this line and the 
traditional customary line for the eastern sector has 
always belonged to China. 
, , CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
019. MALIK (J. Mohan). Hands across the Himalayas: 
Sino-Indian border. Pacific Def Rep. 15, 9; 1989, Mar; 
43-45. 
Presents a critical analysis of Indo-China 
relations reflecting the dispute over the common border 
between the two countries. Exposes the military 
activities of both sides along their Himalayan border 
which determines their mutual relations. 
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Effects of BOUNDARY QUESTION and 
TIBETAN AFFAIRS 
020. NAOLIAM (Ding). sino-Indian dispute. Sttfl 
Studies. 11, 4; 1988, Sum; 92-97. 
Discusses in detail the Sino-Indian dispute 
which consists mainly two problems: the boundary 
question and India's interference in the Tibetan 
affairs. 
, , HIMALAYAN STALEMATE 
021. DESHINGKAR (Girl). Himalayan stalemate ;Beijing 
puts onus on New Delhi. Times Ind. 1989, Dec, 13; 6:3. 
While the Chinese expressed their desire to 
forget the immediate past (the Teananmen Square incident 
and recognise "great improvement" in India-China 
relations, they seemed to have warily resigned 
themselves to the present stalemate on the border 
question. Although they said that the will and effort on 
both sides, there was no official Chinese response to 
the suggestions made by members of an Indian group which 
recently visited China. 
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, , HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS 
022. HABIBULLAH (E). India-China thaw: Human 
consideration. Mainstream.26, 9; 1987, Dec, 12; 22. 
Discovers that since the start of India-China 
negotiations over the border dispute the, human side had 
not been taken into considerations objectively. While 
drawing geographical lines between the two countries, 
the sector-by-sector approach should make sure that no 
people and their territory is cut into two, but that the 
whole people, with their culture move over to the 
northern or southern big power. Emphasises on the need 
to discard outdated political thinking. 
, , INDIAN CASE, AKSAI CHIN 
023. VOHRA (Sahdev). Aksai Chin through the ages. 
Mainstream. 26, 9; 1987, Dec, 12; 15-21. 
Traces the Indo-China border dispute into the 
deep roots of the past. States the Chinese advance into 
Aksai Chin, and by the end of the war of 1962 occupation 
of over 15,000 sq. miles of Ladakh. Discusses India's 
case for Aksai Chin with a general background right 
from the second half of Nineteenth century. 
, , INDIAN PERSPECTIVES 
024. INDIAN-CHINA border problem: An Indian point of 
view (Editorial). Link. 34, 36; 1992, Apr, 19; 17-22. 
Comments on the India-China border issue with a 
brief historical background. Investigates the border 
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problems through decades and represents an Indian 
perspective on the dispute and suggests effective 
measures for its resolution. 
, , ISSUES for CONSENSUS 
025. Sino-Indian border dispute: need for a national 
consensus. Mainstream. 1988, Oct, 8; 33-34. 
Discusses the border dispute between India and 
China in detail. The discussions and the meetings of the 
officials as well as political leaders from both the 
sides had not proved to be fruitful. Realises the need 
to have a wide spread agreement upon the Indian stand on 
the border issue and gain support frm the masses to take 
bold steps in favour of the national interests. 
, , ISSUE and IMPLICATIONS 
026. BANAERJE (D). India-China relations and Chinese 
military capability. Trishul. 3, 1; 1990, Jul; 66-77. 
Describes the India-China relations with a 
reference to the Sino-Indian border issue, the iportance 
of Tibet which figure proinently on the Sino-Indian 
border question and China's world view. Discusses with 
emphasis on the growing military power of China which 
determines the bilateral relations between India and 
China. The increasing strength of the PLA and the 
significant nuclear weapon capability of China are of 
serious concern. 
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, , McMAHON LINE, CONTROVERSIAL EXISTENCE 
027. SINGH (S P). Mapping a line. Hind Times. 1987, 
Apr, 19,; 9:5. 
Traces the origin and history of McMahon Lone 
in brief. Tells that the birth of the McMahon Line was 
fortuitous as its existence is controversial. Discusses 
the disputes and controversies regarding the exact 
location of the locus through the ages between Indian 
and China as well as China and Tibet. 
, , NEGOTIATIONS 
028. BY TALKS alone (Editorial). Hind Times. 1987, 
Apr, 24; 9:1. 
Comments on the latest Chinese allegations 
about Indian violation of its border and air space near 
Arunachal Pradesh and their reputation by New Delhi 
which had pulled the two sides a step away from mutual 
understanding. It was evident that India would risk 
serious consequences if it did anything to undo the 
Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu valley. Argues 
that a peaceful solution of the boundary question based 
on mutual understanding and mutual accommodation can be 
achieved through talks only. 
029. JOSHI (Manoj). Coutious round: Progress at 
Sino-Indian talks. Front line. 10, 15; 1993, Jul, 17-30; 
32-33. 
deliberations at the meeting of Joineworking Group show 
a considerable development for the resolution of the 
delayed Sino-Indian border dispute. 
, , , EIGHT ROUNDS 
030. RAJAN (Shubha) and MALVIYA (Gopalji). Sino-Indian 
relations: Eight rounds. Strg Studies J. 2, 2; 1989; 
71-81. 
Informs in detail about the developments during 
the meetings of the Joint Working Group. Reviews the 
deliberations at eight rounds of talks and their 
achievements so far. Observes that there had been no any 
considerable and concrete outcome at the meetings of the 
Joint Working Group throughout the eight rounds, over 
the border issue. 
, , , INDIAN PERCEPTIONS, 1981-89 
031. GANGULY (Sumit). Sino-Indian border talks, 
1981-1989: A view from New Delhi. Asian Survey. 29, 12; 
1989, Dec; 1123-35. 
Traces the evolution of peace talks on the 
border issue. Discusses in detail the eight round of 
border talks between 1981 and 1988 with the process 
involved. Investigates Rajiv Gandhi's China visit in 
Dec, 1988 and its aftermath. Concludes that the future 
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of the Sino-Indian border issue depends much on the 
political leadership in both countries. 
, , , INDIAN STAND, Effect of NINETH GENERAL 
ELCTIONS, 1989 
032. LALL (John). Talks with China: No break through 
before polls. Statesman. 1989, Jul, 1; 6:4. 
Discusses the negotiations between India and 
China for the resolutions of their boundary dispute. 
Investigates into the stand of the Indian side which 
remained unchanged and there was no any sign of a 
positive and bold initiative on the part of the Indian 
Government because the 9 General Elections were ahead 
and any such initiative over the emotional boundary 
issue might have cost the prospects of the congress 
party. 
, , NEHRD'S VISION 
033. JASJIT SINGH. India-China dispute: Nehru's 
approch-Most rational. Mainstream. 26, 5; 1987, Nov, 14; 
9-10, 31. 
Describes China's border problems with its 
neighbours and Indo-Tibetan as well as Ladakh-tibetan 
border settlements on well established boundary 
principles. Asserts, a closer reading of facts would 
reveal Nehru's perceptiveness and vision in dealing with 
the Indo-China border issue which is still the most 
rational. 
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, , NUCLEAR EXPLOSINS 
034. CHINGAPPA (B M). India-China relations: Issues 
and implications. Stra_ Analysis. 16, 1; 1993, 
Apr; 39-50. 
Discusses the selected issues like Chinese 
military modernisation, Beijing's relations with South 
Asian states, the boundary problem and the Chinese 
nuclear explosion in May, 1992 coinciding with the 
Indian Presidents visit there which have a negative 
impact on India- China relations except smooth matnageinent 
of boundary problem and the recent nuclear explosion. 
, , PROSPECTS 
035. MEHTA (K L). Sino-Indian border dispute. PTI 
Feature. 8, 48; 1988, Jun, 24; PF - Dll. 
Indicates a positive sign in the bilateral 
relations of India and China bserves a trend in this 
direction and exposes some great achievements regarding 
the dilution of their mutual distrust in recent future. 
, , RETROSPECTS and PROSPECTS 
036. JOSHI (Manoj). Sino-Indian border problems. 
Stra Analysis. 15; 7; 1994, Oct; 683-94. 
Analysis critically the retrospects of the 
Indo-China border issue in the light of various 
armed-conflicts, the efforts of the Joint VJorking Group, 
;)U 
the negotiations ranging from the first Prime Minister 
of India, Jawahar Lai Nehru to the present regime of 
Narasimha Rao. Tells the adjustments of the Line of 
Actual control through mutual understanding and mutual 
adjustment based on the principles of Logical 
considerations, administrative convenience and 
geographical principals and suggests a proposal to 
enhance peace and tranquillity. 
, , SETTLEMENT 
037. NARENDRA SINGH. Dealing with China. Times Ind. 
1987, May, 31; Magazine, 1:1. 
Shares briefly some impressions of China after 
a recent visit, to join in the quest for an answer to 
the questions like," will the current situation 
encourage China to try to settle its long border dispute 
with India ? Or, will they turn bellicose once again 
trying to rope in the USA and Pakistan against imaginary 
Indo-Soviet designs and thus divert attention in the 
west from the sieving down of their economic plans ? 
, , / COUSTRh\HT:S 
038. MALIK (J Mohan). China border: Tension reduced 
but settlement distant. Pacific Def Rpp^ 15, 1; 1988, 
Jul; 28-30. 
Presents a critical review of the Sino-Indian 
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border issue. Although the tension on the border had 
been reduced to a considerable degree with a joint 
effort from both sides, but a final settlement of the 
border problem faces certain constraints. Contains a map 
of the Sino-Indian border. 
, , , CULTURALEXTENTION 
039. SEN (Mohit). India-China : New possibilities. 
Mainstream. 26, 18; 1988, Frb, 13; 4, 32. 
Investigates into the new power poition, 
responsibility and possibilities of India and China for 
the improvements in relations in the context of their 
domestic changes as well as the stormy changes all over 
the world. Both India and China are in a far better 
position today to take new initiatives for the 
resolution of old, outstanding problems. They can start 
from extending trade and cultural relations, pending the 
border issue. 
, , , DENG'S PACKAGE 
040. NOORANI (A G). Has P M accepted Deng's package? 
Ind Exp. 1989, Jan, 10; 8:3. 
Probes into the negotiations held on the border 
issue between India and China at various levels at 
different times. Investigates, deeply into the outcome of 
the negotiations and talks held between Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
and many top leaders a China during his historical visit 
to China in December 1988. Among other things the 
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working group was expected to consider a reworking of 
the Deng proposal of 1979-80. 
, , , FALLACIES 
041. PADFGAONKAR (Dileep). Sino-indian relations: No 
room for pious hopes. Times Ind. 1987, Jun, 30; 6:3. 
Discusses that although both India and China 
had agreed to tlak on their bilateral relations, the 
compulsions to proceed along these lines were not at all 
clear. The military situation along the borders 
remained tense very few indications were there to show 
the Chinese ansiousness to settle the boundary dispute 
in a spirit of give-and-take, concludes, there is no 
firm basis to believe that China is really interested in 
the settlement of the border issue. 
, , , IMPLICATIONS for RAPPROCHEMENT 
042. NARENDRA SINGH. Border deal with China. Times 
Ind. 1987, Aug, 11; 6:7. 
Tells the Chinese opinion that "before the 
settlement of the border question, India and China shold 
try to develop relations in other areas" and the 
indications from India for the possible accetance of the 
advice. Although, the formula seems logical. But, this 
approach has proved barren in the past and holds certain 
dangers, would certainly be a change from the earlier 
format that a border settlement was basic and vital for 
[)3 
normalising Sino-Indian relations. Sketches the merits 
of trying to concentrate on developing Sino-Indian 
relations in other areas and of focusing primarily on 
the border dispute. 
, , , NEGOTIATIONS 
043. ABBASI (Abdur Razzaq Khan). Sino-Indian 
relations. Stra Stodies. 11, 4; 1988, Sum; 98-107. 
Discusses in detail the bilateral relations of 
India and China in the light of their prolonged 
hostility along the border. With a brief historical, 
background, recalls their friendly days and emphasises 
on the resolution of the border issue through mutual 
understanding and peaceful negotiations. 
044. JOSHI (Manoj). India-China border: Time for 
political leadership to act. Hindu. 1990, Aug, 30; 8:3. 
Investigates into the border dispute between 
India and China. Observes the increasing interaction in 
various fields between the two countries and argues that 
there was a time, mature, for, the settlement of the 
prolonged border dispute through mutual negotiations 
between the top political leaders from both sides. 
045. LET'S FROGET the past (Editorial). Radiance. 
1989, Jan, 1; 2. 
Sino-Indian border issue, central to the 
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Sino-Indian relationship, needs to be resolved through 
negotiations. Rajiv Gandhi's China-visit in Dec. 1988 
was a step forward in this direction. Let us be 
realistic and pragmatic in our approach to get out of 
past bitterness. 
, , , POLICY PACKAGE 
046. RAGOTRA (M K). Sino-Indian relations: Resolving 
boundary dispute. Hind Times. 1987, May, 13; 9:3. 
Surveys the Sino-Indian border dispute through 
the pages of history. Adopts an analytical approach in 
the context of the importance of their bilateral 
relations for Asian region and to some extent for the 
world as a whole. Reflects that New Delhi had been 
sending wrong signals to Beijing in the last two or 
three years. Suggests a four-point policy package for a 
settlement of the tangled boundary dispute. 
, , , POSSIBILITIES 
047. LALL (John). Approaching India-China boundary 
dispute: Focus. Mainstrecua. 27, 11; 1988, Dec, 10; 5-7. 
Observes a mature time combined with the 
situations favourable for the settlement of the border 
dispute. Expects a agreement over the border issue 
during the forthcoming visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing 
in December, 1988. 
55 
, , , SECTOR APPROACH 
048. VOHRA (Sahdev). Parameters of a border settleme 
with China. Mainstream. 28, 23; 1990, Mar, 31; 16-19. 
Examines critically the various factors 
involved in the border settlement between India and 
China. India's northern frontier with China of enormous 
lenyth (about 2390 miles) runs through some of the most 
difficult mountain areas of the world. A sector-wise 
approach is advocated for analysing the border 
differences because the nature of the problems are 
varied in each of the three sectors- the western sector; 
the middle sector; and the eastern sector. 
, , TIBET 
049. DDTTA (Surjit). Sino.Indian relations: some 
issues. Stra Analysis. 11; 1988, Feb; 1239-64. 
Discusses the various aspects of Sino-Indian 
relations through decades. The issues around which the 
Sino-Indian relation revolves, e.g., the border 
dispute, Tibet problem, the statehood, of Arunachal 
pradesh etc. have remained the same and there is no 
change in the stand on each side. 
, , TRENDS, COOPERATIONS, Effect of GLOBAL CHANGE 
050. MAXWELL (Nevile). India's China border dispute 
revisited. Mainstream. 27, 26; 1989, Mar, 25; 9-11. 
Observes a new trend in the Sine.Indian border 
dispute. The process of normlization in the bilateral 
relations between the two countries had got a fresh 
impe. us in the changing world order which called for 
cooperation in other fields. 
, , , , Through PENDING RESOLUTION 
051. SHARHA (M M). Indo-Chinese border dispute 
revisited. Organiser. 40, 42; 1989, Apr, 23; 8-10. 
Discusses a fresh insight into the Sino-Indian 
border issue. The new stage in Sino-Indian relations had 
set a new trend. Expects the normalisation of the 
bilateral relations between the two countries improving 
their interactions in otherspheres pending a final 
resolution of the border issue. 
, , , MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
052. CHOUDHURY (Dilara). Sino-Indian border dispute: 
Some recent developments. Biiss J. 9, 1; 1988; 24-45. 
Present view of the developments taken place 
along the Sino-Indian border recently in 1987. Exposes a 
5 7 
kind of danger which India might have faced due to the 
mobilization of the Chinese troops along the border. 
Exposes a trend of mutual understanding between the two 
countries which can avoide future skirmishes. 
, BORDER ISSUES, LEGACY of the PAST 
053,LALL (Jchn). Sino-Indian border problem: Left over of 
history. World Aff. 3, 2; 1994, Dec; 23-29. 
States that India and China have enjoyed two 
thousand years of friendship. Presents the assertion 
which is only partially true, was made in China's note 
of March 22 1962 that" the Sino-Indian boundary question 
is left over by history, for which, being newly 
independent, the two countries could not be held 
responsible. There was was indeed a border question 
which had not been finally resolved before the British 
left India. 
, , PROSPECTS 
054. VOHRA (Sahdev). Issues regarding India-China 
border agreement. DSI J. 118, 491; 1988, Jan-Mar; 7-13. 
Analysis critically the prospects of 
Sino-Indian relations on the basis of the prolonged 
Sino-Indian border issue. Mentions the developments 
which had avoused a fresh tension across the boundary in 
sumdurong valley in 1986-87. Emphasises on the need to 
have a border agreement to ensure peace along the border. 
, , REINFORCEMENT of FORCES, CHINA 
055. SUBRAHMANYM (K). Chinese threat: 25 years after 
the attack. Times Ind. 1987, May, 9; 6:3. 
Even after 25 years of Chinese attack on India, 
the border dispute between the two countries has not 
been solved. Being motivated by the recent reports of 
China reinforcing its forces in Tibet- a reinforcing of 
a kind and force level that had not been seen since 
1962, recalls the events that preceeded the Chinese 
attack in 1962. Observes a remarkable similarity in the 
pattern of events now and of the months prceedign the 
fateful autumn of 1962. Talks about the possibility of 
China and Pakistan resorting jointly to interventionist 
and coevcive diplomacy. Concludes that India should be 
extremely cautious in the coming months. 
, , UNFRIENDLY SIGNALS, CHINA 
056. ABRAHAM (AS). Messages from China: Putting the screws 
on India. Times Ind. 1987, May, 22; 6:3. 
Discusses various messages sent from China over 
the last year to New Delhi. A series of unfriendly, evne 
belligesent signals. For instance, on May 7, the 
Washington Post correspondent in Beijing, Daniel Souther 
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land, quoted a Chinese spokesman, Ma Yushen, as warning 
India that if it wanted to avoid an unpleasant event, 
then "the intruding Indian military personnel (from the 
sumdorong Chuvaley) will be withdrawn as soon as 
possible so as to relax the tense situation". The 
Chinese have again and again objected strongly to 
India's decesion to upgrade Arunachal Pradesh to 
statehoped. Deals with some menacing postures and 
bilateral questions. Expects that the external affairs 
minister, Mr. N.A. Tiwan' s visit to Beijing nest month 
will be able to break the ice and the present freeze may 
eventually warm up. 
, BORDER TALKS, Effects of TlBST 
057. CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhil). Tibet and Indian 
diplomacy. Mainstream. 31, 37; 1993, Jul, 24, 13-15. 
Brings into notice, certainly all the issues of 
direct concern, strategic and environmental, that the 
situation in Tibet posses for India. Presents an 
important issue before Indian diplomacy to raise it in 
the India-China border talks without changing its formal 
stand on Tibet. Asserts that if one were to go by past 
prceedents, then the Tibetan side should have a place in 
any India-China border talks. 
GO 
, , EIGHT ROUND, ENTENTE, 1987 
058. BEYOND ATMOSPHERICS (Editorial). Times Ind. 
1987, Nov, 19; 6:1. 
Examines the eight round of official had not 
led to any brea through in solving the con. entious 
border issue. But this cannot detract attention from 
their long-term significance. The discussions on this 
occasion had resulted in a common resolve to enferce 
peace and tramquillity all along the border pending a 
negotiated settlement. Expects that the time is ripe to 
work towards an entente. 
, , , OPTIMISM, 1987 
059. MALHOTRA (Inder). Beyond the eighth round. 
Times Ind. 1987, Nov, 26; 6:3. 
Discuses the progress made during the eigth 
round of talks between the officials of India & China. 
Examines the gains made as a result of the 
conversations. Were limL ed and call for cautious 
optimism rather than euphoria. But it would be wrong to 
understimate their significance, only becouse the eighth 
round has resulted in a remarkable revesral of the 
earlier negative trend in the prdonged dialogue. Both 
sides are clearly committed to maintain" peace and 
tranquillity" along the border until a mutually 
satisfactory border settlement is reached, at the end of 
the eighth round. 
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, , , SPECULATIONS, 1987 
060. PARANJPE {V V). India-China border can be 
settled. Times Ind. 1987, Nov, 16; 6:7. 
Fresh speculations about a possible border 
settlement through official-level Sino-Indian border 
talks. Discusses whether the eith round of border talk 
would be any different from the preceeding ones? 
Examines what generally happens at these official level 
talks. VJhat is needed is realism, flexibility and above 
all "Political will" to solve the problem. Reviews the 
changes which have taken place on the global pattern. 
Reveals, the leaders today are more intent on national 
development than on continuing an ungeinly quarrel. 
Concludes, in the changed pesspectives lies the hope of 
better Indo-China relations. 
, , LOW-PROFILE APPROACH 
061.LOW-KEY TALKS (Editorial). Times Ind. 1989, jul, 10; 
6:1. 
Describes that both Beijing and New Delhi 
had chosen to be discreet about the outcome of the first 
meeting of the India-China Joint V^ /orking Group as vi?ell 
as of the first annual consultations held 
simultaneously at the level of foreign secretaries in 
the Chinese capital Expresses that the disevetion should 
not be allowed to mislead that there had been no 
movement forward in the relations between the two 
countries after Rajiv Gandhi's path-breaking visit to 
China in December, 1988. The cautious and low-profile 
approach at the talks was fueled by rattled position of 
Chinese leadership due to the explosion of youthful 
discontent in June, while the Indian leadership bracing 
itself to face a general election. 
, BORDER TENSIONS, Effects of CHINESE BUILD-UP, 1987 
062. WARNING FROM China (Editorial). Times Ind. 1987 
Apr, 17; 6:1. 
Relates the report on the Chinese build-up in 
Tibet carried in the issue of yesterday and gives reason 
for it, the intention to bring into the open what has 
been whispered in private for some time and to focus 
attention on the kind of dangers the country may be 
facing. Expects that once again the Chinese were 
planning to cut India down to size. Suggets to take our 
own dicisions on the basis of our own information and 
resources. 
, , Effects of MISINFORMATIONS, 1987 
063. RIKHYE (Ravi). Chinese build-up on border. 
Times. Ind. 1987, Apr, 16; 1:2. 
Reports from a variety of sources Tibetan 
diplommatic and Indain and western intalligence, 
indicated that China would attack on India in the summer 
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of 1987. The Chinese mobilisation could not be explained 
solely in terms of a fear of an Indian attack. There 
were other factors too, which have been discussed. 
, , 1987 
064. SWAMY (Subramaniam). Are we heading for a war 
in China? Sunday. 1987, Feb, 1; 29-33. 
Discusses the possibility of a war with China 
in the summer of 1987. The fresh tension was created on 
the border with the mobilization of the forces from each 
side of the border. The media, particularly the western 
media misinter-preted and provided misinformation about 
the intentions of the armed forces and their activities 
on the other side. 
, , NORMALISATION, 1987 
065. IMPROVING SINO-INDIAN relations (Editorial), 
Hindu. 1987, May, 19; 8:1. 
Exposes the improving relations betv/een India 
and China after a critical situation of fresh tensions 
aroused from the mobilization of trops from both the 
sides. The misinformation about each other's activities 
along the border, led to the new developmetns which 
couldn't last for long and the situation became normal. 
, , SECURITY MEASURES, INDIA 
066. DUTTA (Surjit). China and India's security 
envinment. Trishul. 2; 1990, Jan; 42-47. 
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Sino-Indian border with respect to the border tensions 
over decades between India and China. Observes India's 
heavy burden of expences over defence along the 
Sino-Indian boundary to maintain the border safety. 
, BORDER WAR, 1987 
067. AVOIDABLE SCARE (Editorial). Hind Times. 1987, 
Jun, 4; 4:1. 
Reflects that the regularity with which scaring 
news reports were emanating from western sources about 
strong possibilities of an India-China border war was 
rather surprising. Both the countries were passing 
through a phase when armed conflict with a powerful 
adversary cannot produce political dividends for either. 
Concludes, a new found pf boundary meet would creare a 
psychological impression shov;ing their interests in 
seeking a solution. 
, CHINESE CRACKDOWN, REACTIONS, INDIA . 
SEE NO evil(EcLitoTlaL). Inj E x ^ . 1989, Jun, 23; 8:1. 
Exposes the insensitivity of the Indian 
Government to the inhuman repression in China. The 
Government of India's action was in sharp contrast with 
that of the Government of alomst all democratic 
countries which had roundly condemned the Deng regime. 
Doordarshan had been consistently acting almost as an 
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organ of the Deng regime. Concludes that any argument 
that this would induce beijing to take a softer line on 
the border issue is unbelievable. 
— . — , — . , 1989 
069. MALHOTRA (Inder). Chinse crackdown and India. Times 
Ind. 1989, Jun, 29; 6:3. 
Records India's reaction on the tremendous 
upsurge in China in support of demands for democracy and 
political reformed as well as the brutal crackdown. 
Analyses the silence of Indian government over the 
suppressive policy of China towards the student lead 
movement and the bloodshed by the hands of People's 
Liberation Army. 
, CHINESE POLICY ON KASHMIR 
070. SIWEI (Mao). China and the Kashmir issue. Stra 
Analysis. 17, 12; 1995, Mar; 1573-95. 
Tells that unlike the United States and some 
other countries, China has kept a low profile for quite 
some time in its policy towards the Kashmir issue. 
However, that does not mean that China is not very 
relevant to the problem. As the kashmir issue, has always 
been a touchstone to test any country's relationships 
with India and Pakistan, China's policy expression 
and diplomatic behaviour in this regard can 
GG 
also be observed as a sensitive indicator of Chinese 
strategic thinking on the subcontinent. 
, CHINESE PREMIER, LI PENG VISIT, ADDRESSES, 
COOPERATIONS, 1991 
071. BHARTIA (Shobhana). India and China must 
co-operate, says Li. Hind Times. 1991, Sep, 12; 1:4. 
Incorporates the extracts of the addresses 
at press conferences and speaches delivered at various 
occasions by the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng 
at Beijing in the first week of September, 1991. He 
had emphasised the need for a eps to improve 
relations betv/een India and China. He hoped that 
under the new international situation, China and 
India would bring aside past grievances and live in 
peace and friendship so that the relations between the 
two peoples and two governents. 
, , , ASSESMENTS by LEFTIST 
072. BHARRACHARYA (Malabika). Left Coutious in 
assessing Peng's visit. Ind. Exp. 1991, Dec, 16; 1:2. 
Tells that the countries left parties, 
especially the comunist Party of India (Marxist), did 
not mind helping the Prime Minister Mr. P.V. Narsimha 
Rao revive friendship with China. VJest Bengal's leftist 
leaders, who play a major role in shaping the communist 
67 
movement in the country, prefert to look at the Dec. 
1991 visit of Mr. Li Peng, the Chinese Premier, with 
almost caution. Observes that they were not sure how 
India and China can come together and form a club to 
counter the US advances in the third world. 
, , , ASSURANCE on MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL 
REGIME (MTCR), 1991 
073. DEAR (M K). Peng visit ends with assurance on 
observing MTCR. Hind Times. 1991, Dec, 17; 1:5. 
Reviwes Mr. Li Peng's visit to India (from Dec. 
11 to Dec. 16, 1991) and probes into the significant 
developments in the India-China relations and the new 
trends established in various bilateral issues, brings 
into notice that the Chinese Prime Minister ended 
his six-day memorable Indian visit by his assurance 
to the Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao that his 
country was strongly oppased to terrorism and use of 
force in solving bilateral issues and that Beijing 
intended to observe Mersile Technology control Regime 
(MTCR) in future and did not export arms to disturb 
existing balances. 
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, , , BILATERAL ISSUES, UNRESOLVED, 1991 
074. BHATTACHARJEA (Mira Sinha). Li Peng visit: A pale 
replay of 1954. Hind Times. 1991, Dec, 23; 11:3. 
Examines the visit of Chinese Prime Minister, Li 
Peng to Indian which has neither generated a new 
optimism nor has it caused any great disappointment. 
Rather in their own uncharismatic ways the two leaders 
did cut down to serious consideration of bilateral 
issues and global futures. Reveals that the unresolved 
bilateral problems cast a long shadow over Premier Li's 
visit. Discovers that the border issue and the question 
of the status of Tibet will continue to havnt India-
China relations until finally resolved. 
, , , BORDER, ABJURING USE Of FORCE, 1991 
075. DUA (H K). Peng visit significant: Bid to abjure use 
of force along border. Hind Times. 1991, Dec, 8; 1:1. 
Reflects that a considerable importance was 
being given by both New Delhi and Beijing to the need 
to improve relations between India and China at the 
forthcomming talks between both the countries during 
Mr. Li Peng's visit to India in the second week of 
Dec. 1991. While exact formulations were not known 
India could be working out for an agreement to rule out 
the use of force along the entire Sino-Indian border. 
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By implication this did not mean giving up the 
territorial claims made by either side. But, the idea 
was clearly motifated by the feeling that real peace 
and tranquillity cannot be ensured without abjuring the 
use of force. 
, , , BORDER ISSUE, MESSAGE, ILLUSIVE, 1991 
076. PARANJPE (V V) Li Pengs visit: Border issue. Hind 
Times. 1991, Dec, 27; 11;7. 
Describes that Li Peng in his pre-visit 
interview to Hindustan Times made two points on the 
border issue: (a) Given sincerity and a spirit of 
accomodation on both sides, the border issue can be 
solved, (b) In the meantime, both sides should stick to 
the Line of Actual control. Although, Li Peng had 
reiterated the Chinese stand on the border issue, to 
most Indians the message was misinterpreted. But to 
those who know the background the message was clear. Li 
Peng's visit to India had been a good thing because it 
seemed to show a new awakening of interest in and need 
for cooperation with India. 
— / — , — , — , 1991 
077. NATWAR SINGH (K). Li Peng: A passage to India. 
Hind Times. 1991, Dec, 11; 11:3. 
Tells that the question of defining the border 
attracts its due place in the totality of our 
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political, economic, cultural and scientific relations. 
Reflects that Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Li Peng had 
pointed in this direction. It is not beyond human 
ingenuity find ways and means home of defining and 
dilineating the frontier. Concludes that the 
refashioning of India-China relations should not be 
viewed in times of narrow domestic partisanship. 
, , , CHANGING RELATIONS#1991 
078. BROTHERS AGAIN? (Editorial). Econ Times. 1991, 
Dec, 2; 10:1. 
Observes that the forthcoming visit of the 
Chinese Prime Minister, Mr.Li Peng, Coincided with the 
end of the Cold war and represented a Chance to 
transform relations. China no longer needed to look on 
India as a proxy for the Soviet Union. That in turn 
meant it had less reason to try and counter India's 
strength by giving missile and nuclear technology to 
Pakistan. Asserts that both, countries need to 
cooperate in economic sphere and can gain mutually by 
reducing military spending along their common border. 
» / , Effects of GLOBAL CHANGE, 1991 
079. TURNING POINT (Editorial). Mainstream. 30, 9; 
1991, Dec, 21; 1-2. 
Observes Li Peng's visit in August, 1991 as the 
first visit of a Chinese Premier to new Delhi in three 
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decades. Tells about a substantial convergence of 
views of Li Peng and our Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha 
Rao, on the principles that should govern the new 
international order, their discussions paved the way 
for closer Chinese interaction with India in the world 
fora. Admits, the visit signifies a turning point in 
the history of Sino-Indian relations. 
, , , , FRIENDLY POSTURES, 1991 
080. SEN GUPTA (Bhabani). India- China Summit; No 
win-Lose result. Hind Times. 1991, Dec, 19; 13:1. 
Probes analytically into the Li Peng's visit to 
India and discussions made between the Prime Ministers 
of the two countries. Scruitinised the results of the 
Li-Rao meetings to determine who won and who lost. 
Reflects that it was not a win-or-lose encounter, but a 
joint search for ways and means of achieving two 
objectives: first, how to remove the binds of the 
border dispute and normalise relations, and secondly, 
what the two countries together could do to impact the 
new world order. 
, , , IMPACT, 1991 
181. LI PENG in New Delhi (Editorial). Mainstream. 30,8; 
1991, Dec, 14; 1-2. 
Coments on the visit of the Chinese Prime 
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Minister, Li Peng to India inAugust 1991, termed as 
"historic occasion" by our Prime Minister, Narasimha 
Rao. Accepts as one more step in forging better ties 
between the two Asian Giants. Warns against over-
optimism about the outcome of the visit and suggests a 
realistic view. Concludes, Li Peng's visit to India 
will turnout to be a landmark, provided it enjects the 
eleent of trust in bilateral ties between New Delhi and 
Beijing. 
, , , IMPROVEMENTS, 1991 
082. RAM (N). Burdens of the past. Econ> Times.1991,Nov, 
9:2. 
Conveys that Chinese Premier Li Peng's December 
visit was being expected to bring a fine opportunity to 
consolidate and take forward the important improvement 
that had taken place in the Sino-Indian relationship 
over the past five years, and particularly after Rajiv 
Gandhi's Late - 1988 visit. Observes that if India and 
China can avoid reiterating their rigid positions, they 
can develop a mutually advantageous relationship. 
Suggests that the boundary question can be resolved 
only on the basis of give and take by treating it as a 
problem left over by history. 
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, — , , 1991 
083. DOTT (V P). No leap, but a step forward. Hind 
Times. 1991, Dec, 22; 1:1. 
Analyses the outcome of the visit of the Chinese 
Premier, Mr. Li Peng in December, 1991. There were 
euphoric expectations about the achievements of the 
visit. Although, the visit could not bring about a 
vital development, its significance can not be ignored 
as it paved the way towards normalization of the 
bilateral ties between India and China. 
084. PARANJPE (V V). Li Peng's visit: Beijing gains 
more Hind Times.1991, Dec, 26; 11. 
Examines critically the Chinese Premier Mr. Li 
Peng's Peng's visit to India in the second week of 
December 1991. The meetings held between Li Peng and 
his Indian Counterpart present a view of the outcome of 
the visit. Although, it becomes difficult to analyse 
which side was benefitted more, it is opined with 
certain concrete outputs that Beijing gained more. 
, , , PROSPECTS, 1991 
085. SEN GUPTA (Bhabani). Waiting for Mr. Li: can 
Delhi turn a new leaf? Statesman. 1990, Sept, 11; 6:4. 
Tells about the implications of the forthcoming 
visit of the Chinese Premier Mr.Li Peng to India in the 
second week of 1991. Probes into the capability of New 
Delhi to open a new phase in the hostilities and 
starting cooperations in various fields. 
, , , PROSPECTS and IMPLICATIONS, 1991 
086. DUTT (V P). Possibilities and pitfalls Hind Times. 
1991, Dec, 8; Magazine, 2:1. 
Recalls that the late Chinese Prime Minister, 
Zhou Enlai, Came to India in 1960 at the height of the 
India- China contention over the border issue and went 
back leaving a trail of bitternese on both sides. Some 
three decades and more later another Chinese Prime 
Minister, Li Peng was coming to India when India has 
vastly changed since then, so has Chine, so has the 
World, great possibilities ware there in the visit. 
There were also pitfalls to be avoided. Comments on the 
implications of Premier Li Peng's forthcoming visit to 
India. 
, , , RAPPROCHEMENTS, 1991 
087. LI'S VISIT and after (Editorial). Ind Exp. 1991, 
Dec, 17; 8:1. 
Describes that India and China were too 
preoccupied with sorting out their own decades-old 
"^  r 
f[) 
bilateral problems to launch any effort for shaping a 
new world order against the US hegemony and taking any 
worthwhile initiative to provide a new design of even 
inter- Asian relationships, which was clear from the 
Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Li Peng's five-day visit to 
New Delhi. The border dispute dominated his talks with 
his Indian Counterpart, and they achieved success only 
perhaps in improving the climate for a reasonable 
settlement observes that what remains to be seen is 
whether China is willing to give up every piece of 
border territory it occupied in 1962. 
088. PRAKASH (K N). Sino-Indian ties: Towards a 
pragmatic relationship. Civ Ser Chro. 2,9; Feb; 24-27. 
Analyses the emerging Sino-Indian ties in the 
new global scenario. Special ephasis is laid on Li 
Pengs visit to India and issues of bilateral concern. 
The historic visit of the Chinese Premier Li Peng to 
India has succeeded to a sail extent in breaking the 
barriers of mutual suspicion and distruct that has 
plagued the relationship between the two Asian gaints 
over the last three decades. Viewed as the emerging 
relationship between China and India would be a crucial 
factor for the new- World order being envisaged in the 
unipolar world. 
7G 
089. TOWARDS FRIENDSHIP (Editorial). Hind Times. 1991, 
Dec, 17; 13;1 
Observes the improving Sino- Indian relations in 
the Con, ext of the Chinese Premier Mr.L. Peng's Delhi 
visit. > Presents argiiments in support of the 
achievements, gained from the visit, towards a friendly 
relation between the two countries. 
, CHINESE VICE-PREMIER, W XUEQIAN VISIT 
090. SESSION WITH Vice-Premier W. Xuegian: An overview 
of Sino-Indian relations (Editorial). Frontline. 5,10; 
1988, May, 14-27 ; 29-33. 
Discusses the Sino-Indian relations in the light 
of the Chinese vice-Preier W Xueqians India visit. The 
meetings held between, the Indian Prime Minister 
Mr.Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Xueqian indicate a positive 
sign in the bilateral relations of the two Asian 
gaints. 
, CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES 
091. RAN CHUNG. Repair confidence between China and 
India. Def Today. 1,1; 1993, Nov; 34-46. 
Spells out on how to build bridges of 
understanding between the two great Asian powers, China 
and India. Contains some dramatic revelations of the 
"behind-the-scenes". Conversations between the then 
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Chinese leaders prior to the comencement of the China-
India war of 1962 is also included. 
INDO-CHINA RELATIONS, COOPERATION, ECONOMIC and 
POLITICAL 
092. GUPTA (Shekhar) and CHAKRAVARTI (Sudeep). 
Sino-Indian relations: vital break through. Ind Today. 
18,18; 1993, Sep, 18-30. 
Records that India and China had entered into a 
new phase econoic and political areas. Their relations 
were expected to be governed by a drastic change in 
their economic orders. Although, the problem along 
their common border recalls uncomfortable experience, 
their future relationships seemed to ima^»6§^ ^kl/'Whiy, 
mutual cooperation in other areas. //^ (^ ^--k 
, , Effects CM? INTERNATIONAL ORDI^V . ^ 
093. BOYOU (Wen). China, India B^itd. ^^k^x\e\i 
international order. China Rep. 29, 3; 1993 Jul-Sep; 
285-98. 
Describes that with the end of the cold war a 
new World formation and a new international order are 
at present in the process of evolving. Presents various 
challenges posed by the Changing international 
situations and the key issues. Proposes to analyse the 
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different opinions on the establishment of a new 
international order, with an emphasis on the Chinese 
proposals and the prospect of cooperation between China 
and India in establishing this new international order. 
, DETENTE, Effects of ECONOMIC and COMERCIAL 
COOPERATIONS 
094. VENKATESWARAN (A P). India-China relations: An 
overview. World Focus. 15, 11-12; 1994, Nov-Dec; 50-52. 
Presents an overview of India- China relations 
covering the transformations in the political and 
economic spheres which has occured over the last 
decade and a half. In the post-Deng period many changes 
are bound to occur which would affect India China 
relations. However, econoic and comercial relations 
will have their due role to play in the process of 
mending fences, one should beware of placing too much 
emphasis on this aspect of India-China interactions. 
But there is a very little room for taking a rosy view 
of India- China relations in regard to the central 
issue, namely the boundary question. Suggests that 
while reviewing India-China relations one should avoid 
recrimination on the one hand and eupheria, on the 
other. 
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, , Effects of GLOBAL CHANGES 
095. KARKI HUSSAIN (T). Relations with China. World 
Focus. 14, 11-12; 1993, Nov-Dec; 47-50. 
Describes that the initiation of Sino-Indian 
detente began in right-earnest in the last decade. The 
end of US- Soviet rivalry has coincided with the end of 
the Sino- Indian Cold War. This development provides 
India and China with a host of opportunities as well as 
challenges. India and China have proceeded to stabilise 
their bilateral relations and to engage in constructive 
diploacy. Exposes that corresponding/ to the 
improvement in the bilateral field, China's regional 
policy has shed off much of its anti-Indian edge. 
, , Effects of INTERNAL and EXTERNAL CHANGES 
096. DUTT (V P). India and China: A Leap into the 
future. World Focus. 14, 11-12; 1993, Nov-Dec; 51-53. 
Provides a speculative peep into the future of 
Indo-China relations which remainds one soewhat 
Uncomfortably of futuristic studies. In the light of 
the present ground realities, tries soe predictions. 
Both the countries are going through a transitional 
phase in the economic as well as political sphares and 
their future bilateral relations are dominantly 
determined by this. Records different possibilities. 
so 
, , Effect of POST-COLD WAR ERA 
097. RUIXIANG (Zheng). Shifting Obstacles in 
Sino-Indian relations Stra Digest. 23, 6; 1993, Jun; 
869-876. 
Observes that Sino-Indian relations are of vital 
importance to the stability of Asia. With the ending of 
the Cold War, their relations have got new 
opportunities and are under pressure for change. 
Argues that by charting the causes of othe recent 
detente, some sense can be made of the major 
implications for Asia and the wider world. 
, DIPLOMACY, CHINA 
098. ABRAHAM (A S). China looks anew at India: Changes 
in a shifting environment. Times Ind. 1985, Jun, 21; 6: 
2. 
Exposes that the Chinese were signalling their 
desire to warm up Sino-Indian relations faster than had 
been the case so far. The Chinese media and the Chinese 
government had made favourable cements on Mr.Rajiv 
Gandhi's foreign trip, especially that to the U.S. and 
Russia. Interestingly, Chinese put an official 
statement indicating an early visit by Rajiv Gandhi to 
China. Observes that India figured in Chinese 
SI 
calculations because India had again demostrated that 
it had good relations with both the superpowers without 
subordinating its interests to either. 
099. DIPLOMATIC SIGNAL (Editorial). Times Ind. 1989, 
Jan, 25; 6:1. 
Draws attention towards the diplomatic signals 
inherent in the speech of China's ambassador to India, 
Tu Gouwei, which he gave to the Krishna Menon Society a 
year ago. There was a hidden reference to "Sumdorong 
Chu" where India had allegedly transgressed the line of 
actual control. Mr.Tu Gouwei expressed his concern over 
the common border that it was not so stable, and is 
even maked with hidden danager". In contrast with that 
tough, speech which caused much anxiety at the time, 
Mr. Tus address last week to the same society was warm, 
and even effusive about Rajive Gandhi's China visit. 
Though Mr. Tu' s address conveys no hint of any 
rethinking in Beijing on the border issue, it is to be 
expected that the publicly-stated negotiating position 
of both will remain unchanged. 
, DIPLOMATIC FORMALITIES 
100. DESHPANDE (G P). Formalities apart. Econ Times. 
1991, Dec, 11; 6:7. 
8^ 
Exhibits that the Indo - China relationship had 
been reactivated once again with the Chinese Premier Li 
Peng's visit to India after a duration of theiryone 
years. Three agreements, on border trade, space 
technology and on consulates- general in Bombay and 
Shanghai were due to be signed. However, the question 
was, whether the Sino-Indian relations ove beyond these 
diplomatic formalities. 
, ECONOMIC COPETITIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
101. BAHL (S K). Transnational Corporations and 
Sino-Indian economic competition. China Rep. 25,1; 
1989, Jan-Mar; 11-38. 
Discusses the role of Transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in the People's Republic of China, in detail. 
Describes also the role of transnationals in the third 
world. Presents a situation which at once calls for 
greater cooperation between the two Asian gaints- India 
and China to evolve common strategies to maximise the 
benefits and minimise the costs involved in their joint 
ventures with TNCs and to stall any exploitation by the 
rich North. However, at another level we have to take 
cognizance of economic rivalvies between India and 
China. Exposes the economic dimension of Sion-Indian 
relations. The intensity of Sino-Indian economic 
S3 
relations not only exists already, but is likely to 
assume serious proportions in the years to come. 
, Effects of EXPORT CONTROL REGIME 
102. PANDE (Savita). India, China and the export 
oontrolregime^ Stra Analysis. 17,5; 1994, Aug; 543 - 554. 
Relates India and China in the context of export 
control regime constituted by two mojor shifts in the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. The export control 
regime prohibits the export of nuclear materials, 
plants. The problems of China as supplier and the 
constraints of India as recipient has been discussed, 
putting thepi on opposite sides of the imaginary line 
drawn within the non-proliferation as well as export 
control regimes. Mentions also the commonality of 
approach and similarity in viewpoints despite their 
differences. Points out scope for developing a common 
approach in their nuclear policies. 
, Effects Q^  GLOBAL CHANGES, COOPERATIONS, SUBSIDING 
HOSTILITIES 
103. KATYAL (K K). New Compulsions, new tempo. Hindu. 
1990, Mar, 27; 3:3. 
Brings into notice the demand of changing world 
order in relation to the international relations. 
particularly the Sino-Indian relations. The emergence 
of a Unipolar world scenario brings certain cumpulsions 
on India and China to revive their their bilateral 
relations and increase the areas of cooperation to 
avert the western hegemony. The joint efforts of India 
and China can contiribute for multipolarity in the 
region as well as at the global level, through 
subsd-dln-g their hostiJities..* 
, Effect of ISRAEL - CHINA MILITARY RELATIONS 
104. KUMARA SWAMY (P R). Israel-China military relations: 
India's red lines. Stra Analysis. 18,6; 1995, Sep; 781-90. 
Reveals the political climate in the region and 
progress in the peace process are helpful for great 
interaction between India and Israel. However, India 
cannot afford to be indifferent towards one aspect of 
Israeli foreign policy that has direct security 
ramifications for India, namely, Israels increasing 
military cooperation with the Peoples Republic of 
China. 
, Effect of KASHMIR ISSUE 
105. RIZVI (Hasan Askari). China and the Kashmir 
problem. Reg Studies. 12, 3; 1994, Sum; 91-99. 
Probes into the Sino-Indian relations with 
respect to the Kashmir problem. As the Kashmir problem 
S5 
As the Kashmir problem has been, a deciding factor for 
determining Indias foreign relations with any country/ 
it establishes the relations with China too. Now, 
Chinas Changed stand of non interference the Kashmir 
problem has supported the confidence-building process 
between the two countries. 
, Effect of SINO-SOVIET TIES 
106. PARANJPE (V V). Sino-Soviet Summit ft India 
Mainstream. 27, 37; 1989,Jun, 10; 9, 12. 
Compares the historic visit of Gorbachev to 
China in May 1989 with the visit paid by the Indian 
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in December 1988 to the 
same country. Examins critically the two visits and 
observes certain similarities and dissimilarities, in 
one way or the other, between Sino-Soviet and 
Sino-Indian border issues. 
, Effect of TIBET ISSUE 
107. CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhil). Tibet and Indo-China 
relations. Econ Times. 1991, Dec, 17; 3;1. 
Examines critically the Indian stand on Tibet 
issue and its impact on Indo-China relations. Goes 
through the retrospective view of India's position on 
the issue and the Chinese response, during high level 
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Sino-Indian official talks. Argues that it is the duty 
of New Delhi to gently offer friendly advice to Beijing 
to take a positive approach towards the Tibetan people, 
particular particularly towards the Dalai Lama, 
Emphasises that the Tibet issue should be given high 
priority in any India - China consultation in future. 
, FOREIGN POLICY, ANALYSIS, INDIA 
108. MALHOTRA (Inder). Political commentary: The making 
of China policy. Times Ind. 1987, Jan 15; 6:3. 
Presents a close and comprehensive look at 
India's China policy Inspite of the Chinese protest 
against the elevation of Arunachal Pradesh to a full 
fledged state, the Indian objective continues to be to 
widen the areas of agreement with China and narrow 
those of disagreement. Dispassiona- e analysis of 
China's recent actions, Indian response and Indo-China 
relations with the reference of China's current 
world-view and wider goals, its internal situation and 
the international powerplay. 
, , CONTRADICTORY 
109. CARVER (John W). Chinese-Indian rivalry in 
Indochina. Asian Survey. 27,11; 1987, Nov; 1205-19. 
Reflects that over the past several years 
contradictory Indian and Chinese policies toward 
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Vietnam and Kampuchea have emerged as a significant 
element of their reations. Asserts, while Sino-Indian 
rivalry in Indochina ranks below other issues, it has 
become an important complicating factor. 
, FOREIGN POLICY towards CHINA 
110. DUA (H K). Reviewing China policy. Hind Times. 
1987, Apr, 22; 9:3. 
Observes that the indications were available 
earlier in 1987 that the Indian Government was in 
favour of taking another look at its policy towards 
China. The Prime Minister's remarks at press conference 
on January 20 suggested that he was in favour of 
initiating a political dialogue with China to resolve 
the boundary question and improve relations in 
political, economic and scientific spheres. Reviews the 
boundary question, troop movement, rebuilding ties and 
soviet advice in this context. Concludes, not only 
India but China must also look afresh at its stand on 
the boundary issue. 
, FOREIGN POLICY towards SOUTH ASIA 
111. DUTT (V P). China and South Asia. IPSA J. 18,1; 
1985, Jul-Sep; 128-147. 
Discovers that much of China's policy towards 
South Asia, like much of South Asian Countries policy. 
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towards China, has revolved, around India and around 
the Sino-Indian relationship, Generally, for most of 
the last three decades, India was in a way an important 
agent in the evolution of Sino-South Asian ties. 
Reveals that India was the focal point in determining 
Chinese foreign policy towards the South Asian region. 
, GLOBAL CHANGE, UNIPOLARITY 
112. SINO-INDIAN relations in a Changing world 
(Editorial). Spotlight Reg Aff. 2,5; 1993, May; 56-59. 
Describes the Sino-Indian relations in the 
changing world order after the demise of bipolarity due 
to the end of the Cold War. The increasing great 
concern to diffuse it into a multipolar world order for 
which India and China have due role to play through 
improving their bilateral ties. 
, GLOBAL CONTEXT 
113. DAMODARAN (A K). India and China in the World. 
Mainstream. 1989, Ann; 91, 93, 95, 97, 99-100, 115-16. 
Provides a historical review of the internal as 
well as external affairs of both India and China. 
Adopts an analytical approach and brings a comparative 
view of various factors influencing their relations 
through the pages of history till 1989. During the last 
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four decades India and China have parallels as well as 
some clearly marked contrasts which assume a global 
significance. 
, HUMANRIGHTS, ROLE OF KASHMIR AND TIBET 
114. LI PENG'S Compulsion (Editorial). Econ Times. 
1991, Dec, 11; 6:1. 
Investigates the mentioning of the Tibetan issue 
a time when human rights had become a central theme in 
western diplomacy, was a strong diplomatic signal on 
the eve of the official visit of the Chinese premier, 
Mr Li Peng. Clearly, the Chinese were putting Tibet at 
the top of their agenda in their talks in India. China 
was not as immune to pressure on this issue as in the 
past. Move than ever Beijing wanted an assurance than 
India would do nothing to encourage dissident activity 
in Tibet Observes that the Indian to the Chinese 
imperatives on Tibet depend to a very large extent on 
its own concerns in Kashmir. 
, IMPLICATIONS for GLOBAL BALANCE 
lis. JAIN (B M). India-China relations: New direction Ind J 
Asian Aff 2,1; 1989, Sum (Jun); 1-15. 
Examines critically the present as well as 
future relationship between India and China in a 
30 
realistic framework of analysis. Observes that both 
the countries have to realize that they are Asia's two 
greatest powers, hence their relationship is of crucial 
significance not only for Asian solidarity and economic 
prosperity but also for the global balance of power. 
, IMPROVEMENTS, ISSUES and IMPLICATIONS, POST-COLD 
WAR SITUATIONS 
116. DUTTA (Surjit). India's evolving relations with 
China. Stra Analysis. 18,4; 1995, Jul; 477-502. 
Descusses the trends of India's evolving 
relations with its large northern neighbour, the 
People's Republic of China which is of considerable 
importance to the efforts to construct a peaceful and 
stable post-Cold War. Asia. Also throws light upon, 
China as a key Security factor in Asia, China's 
interest in India, Cooperation and Confidence-building 
processes between India and China concerns also with 
the post- Deng future of China, growth of Chinese 
military power, emergence of a neo-authoritarian China 
and India's options. Concludes that both India and 
China have enormous interest in the development of 
their relationship for more peaceful and prosperous 
future which can only be achieved by joint efforts. 
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, , PROSPECTS and TRENDS, Effects of GLOBAL 
CHANGE 
117. DUTTA (Sujit). Sino-Indian relations: Prospects 
and trends. Stra Analysis. 13,5; 1990, Aug; 501-15. 
Describes that after 40 years of strained 
relations over territorial, political and security 
issues, India and China enter the last decade of the 
century, seeking trust and a new basis for friendly 
relationships. Records the major developments in the 
90's, and reflects trends and prospects in the 
improvement of relations in the changing global 
environment. Concludes, a cooperative bilateral 
relationship and a benevolent global order in their 
mutual interests. 
, , REDUCTION OF FORCES 
118. SHRI PRAKASH. Sino-Indian relations: Perspectives 
for future. Mainstream. 28, 30; 1990, May, 19; 11-13. 
Indicates the symptoms of improving Sino-Indian 
relations. The agreement on the mutual reduction of 
forces along the border puts both the countries a step 
forward towards the goal of their peaceful border. 
Presents some propsects of their future relations. 
, IMPROVING TIES 
119. MUKERJEE (Dilip). Delhi and Beijing, jlcon Times. 
1991, Nov, 20; 10:7. 
Discovers that the pattern of international 
behaviour that China had adopted required India to take 
that carefully into account in setting a framework for 
bilateral relations. Discusses China's rapproachment 
with Vietnam, Mongolia and Soviet Union relecting 
China's quick movement to normalise her relations in 
the neighbourhood. This had happened in India's case 
too. India and China were no more at odds over 
Cambodia. There are other symbols which can be seen 
perceived in the favour of evolving Beijing - Delhi 
relationship. 
INDO - CHINA RELATIONS, INDIAN DEFENCE MINISTER, SHARAD 
PAWAR VISI^, NEW TRENDS 
120. CHOPRA (V D). Sharad Pawar's China visit: 
Pathbreaking initiative. Link. 34,51; 1992, Ag, 2; 4-7. 
Reveals that Defence Minister Sharad Pawar's 
visit to China in the middle of 1992 had created a new 
stage in Sino-Indian relations and set a new trend. 
Both India and China had taken some concrete steps to 
maintain border peace and improve economic interaction 
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pending a final settlement of the border problem are 
clear signals in this regard. 
INDO-CHINA RELATIONS, INDIAN DEFENCE POLICY 
121. BISWAS (A N). Impact of China on defence policy. 
Statesman. 1990, Mar, 17; Magazine, 3:1. 
Discusses India's Defence policy in detail. 
India's Defence Policy had been dominantly governed by 
the Chinese behaviour and the uncertainty on the border 
from Chinese side. The created sense of insecurity and 
China's policy towards India have contributed a lot to 
the great concern on India's defence making it one of 
the best systems in the world. Of course, bringing a 
heavy burden on the Indian budget. 
122. SHARMA (N A). Our defence budget. Mainstream. 
28,23; 1990, Mar, 31; 14. 
Reviews the defence budget of 1989-90 and 
reflects an urgent need to review all expenditures, 
including defence outlay. However, in view of the 
continuing, hostility of Pakistan, and the uncertainty 
of Chinas postures, we have to be careful in urging 
cuts in defence outlays. Advocates, oneway to keep down 
defence expenditures is to make our diplomacy more 
effective. 
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123. ZOBERI (M). Self-reliance and India's defence 
policy. Mainstream. 26,6; 1987, Nov, 21; 35-37, 42. 
Reveals that the first Five-year-plan paid more 
attention on the economic development than the question 
of India's defence. By 1959, the India-China border 
clashes had started and it was at that time that India 
was offered assistance in the field of defence by 
Soviet Union which finally Cutminated in the MIG-21 
Agreement of 1962. The 1962 conflict on the Indo-China 
border, a humiliating encounter brought a drastic 
change in India's defence policy. Full attention on 
defence was made and self-reliance in defence was 
needed. 
, INDIAN DIPLOMACY, INTRANSPARANCY 
124. NAYAR (K P). MEA must interpret Beijing Signals 
for the people. Econ Times. 1991, Dec, 22; 6;3. 
Explains that those who run the ministry of 
external affairs (MEA) cannot be faulted if they see 
Li Peng's visit to India in laissez faire terms. 
various developments during Li-Rao talks on the issues 
viz, Tibet, Kashmir, Border Settlement, Border Trade 
affecting the Sino-Indian relations were not 
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transparent to the public. Unless a drive is launched 
to educate the public on the advantages of better 
relations with China, the government may find itself 
unable to handle what may develop into an emotional 
issue. 
, INDIAN MILITARY MANAGEMENT, FAILURE, CAUSE, 1962 
125. PATIL (D K). 1962 War: Failure of a system. Def 
Today. 1, 1; 1993 Aug: 75-79. 
Describes the central cause for the failure of 
Indian military management in the 1962 war to the lack 
of an integrated and joint politico- military 
assessment of the threat and the evolution of military 
strategy to counter it. 
, INDIAN PRESIDENT, R.VENKATARAMAN VISIT, 1992 
126. CHOPRA (V D). Upswing in Sino-Indian relations. 
Link. 34,42; 1992, May, 31; 4-8. 
Discovers the significance of President 
R.Venkataraman's visit to China during the last week of 
May, 1992 and in this context the India-China relations 
had witnessed changes in favourable direction, it 
appeared that a common perception between India and 
China had begun to emerge as an official statement 
spoke of the determination of the two countries to 
adopt a forward-looking approach for resolving border 
disputes. 
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127. MATHUR (Ginish). RV's Beijing visit. Link. 34,42; 
1992, May,31; 8-10. 
Disscusses upon President R.Venkataraman's visit 
to China in the last week of May, 1992 which under 
lined one basic fact that pending the resolutions of 
the border dispute through peaceful means and patience, 
the two Asian Giants should cooperate in various fields 
to avert the heyemonistic ambitions of the side 
remaining super power in world politics. 
, INDIAN PRIME MINISTER, NARASIMHA RAO VISIT, 1993 
128. BEYOND BORDERS: Sino-Indian ties after Narasimha 
Rao visit (Editorial). Frontline. 10, 20; 1993, Sep, 
25- Oct, 8; 121-123. 
Examines critically the visit of Narasimha Rao to 
Beijing. Considers the visit as a step forward towards 
the normalisation of the Sino-Indian relations in the 
post- Cold War era. Concludes that both the countries 
can play an important role in the Asia as well as at 
the global level for peace. 
, , , PEACE AGREEMENT,1993 
129. CHAKRAVATTY (Sumit). Emerging Contours of a mature 
relationship. Mainstream. 31, 45; 1993, Sep, 18, 3-4, 
32-33. 
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Brinys a detailed account reporting on the Prime 
Minister Narasimha Rao's visit to China. Contains 
extracts of Rao's address to the students at the 
Beijing University about the age-old civilisational 
ties between India and China. Mr.Rao also dwelt on the 
need to secure "real progress in nuclear disarmament" 
and made passionate appeal for mutual comprehension by 
launching the massive programme of interaction at the 
level of university students of the two countries. The 
peace accord signed on September 7, 1993 lent the most 
meaningful character to the visit which is described as 
a "Landmark agreement". 
130. CHAKRAVARTTY (Sumit). Reaching new heights. 
Mainstream. 31, 44; 1993, Sep, 11; 2, 35. 
Describes the historic and path-breaking 
agreement signed by the Chinese Vice- Foreign Minister, 
Tang Jiakuan and Indian Minister of State for External 
Affairs, R.L. Bhatia in Beijing on September 7, 1993 
has laid the basis for the eventual and final 
settlement of the vexed Siono-Indian boundary dispute. 
The accord, a "Landmark" in the Sino-Indian relations 
underscores a" series of confidence-building measures, 
spelts out for the first time, commitments on the part 
of the two governments. 
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131. PROMISING PROSPECT (Editorial). Mainstream. 31,44; 
1993, Sep, 11;1. 
Reveals that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's 
visit to China in the first week of September 1993 
falsified the wishful forecasts of his crities and 
adversaries at home who had pronounced it in advance as 
going to be a non-event. the agreement on the 
maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of 
Actual Control in the India-China border areas was 
considered as a "landmark" in the Indo-China relations. 
Importance of such an accord will unfold itself with 
the passage of time. 
^ ^ RAJIV GANDHI, BORDER INCIDENTS, P/?EVeis>T\VB ^ TEP<, 
1*32.. -^ EN atJfTACBKfl^ U-ni). Tyy a ^K^-VDU Pact lOtUCU-rvct. 
Discovers that it was difficult to visualise 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's bold positive initiative 
of neighbourly goodwill and cooperation with Pakistan 
and Srilanka but the Prime Minister had both the 
opportunity and the need to rapidly normalise India's 
relations with China. While negotiations to resove the 
border issue are kept moving, both governments make a 
determined effort to attain two cardinal objectives; 
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first, prevent border incidents, and two, pace up the 
improvement of economic, trade, technological, cultural 
and informational relations. 
, , , DIPLOMACY 
133. BARAL (J K), PANDA (Pramod) and MUNI (Nilanchal). 
Rajiv Gandhi's China diplomacy: Dynamics and problems. 
Int Studies. 26,3; 1989, Jul-Sep; 257-70. 
Discusses Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy and 
diplomacy toward's China. He had taken a bold 
initiative with a flexible approach by making his 
official visit to Beijing in December, 1988. During his 
visit he gave assurance upon non-interference of India 
in Tibetan affairs. Deals also with the obstacles in 
his positive approach. 
, , RAJIV GANDHI VISIT, ASSESMENT, 1988 
134. NIHAL SINGH (S). Rajiv's China visit: Much work 
lies ahead. Times Ind. 1989, Jan, 3; 6:3. 
Presents an assessment of the results of Rajiv 
Gandhi's visit to China. The Prime Minister achieved 
the objective of breaking the ice after a political 
hiatus of more than two decades. To make this visit 
possible and to ensure its success, the two sides had 
to put in the necessary work in taking the relationship 
forward. Therefore, much work remained ahead and it is 
necessary to guard against euphoria of the kind which 
confuse wishes with reality. 
, , , CRITICAL APPRAISAL, 1988 
135. LALL (John). India and China: Need for give and 
take. Times Ind. 1989, Jan, 9; 6:7. 
Examines critically the Indo-China relations in 
the context of Rajiv Gandhi's China visit during the 
last week of December 1988 and the official round of 
talks on border differences. The motivation for the 
Sino-Indian summit was essentially bilateral even 
though the influence of the prevailing international 
climate for resolution of old differences should not be 
minimised. 
136. ZAFAR AGHA. Vsits to China, Pakistan exceptionally 
significant. Link. 31,21; 1989, Jan, 1; 7-8. 
Provides a critical appraisal of the Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 
1988. The visit evoked mixed reactions. While the 
Official side presents an extremely promising picture, 
the Opposition leaders say that the Prime Minister had 
returned 'empty-handed from Beijing. Although the 
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Foreign Ministry does not have optimistic view over the 
trip, those who played a key role in the negotiations 
expressed satisfaction with the outcome. 
, , , Effects of GLOBAL CHANGE, 1988 
137. NISHRA (R K). Summing up PM's China visit Link. 
31, 21; 1989, Jan,l; 4-6. 
Reviews in the context of the dynamics of the 
present international situation, Rajiv Gandhi's visit 
to Beijing in December 1988 and finds it was consistent 
with the global trend. Reflects that the visit opens a 
new phase of possibility for the two countries to learn 
from the past, to recognise the present realities and 
to try to build a future relationship based on respect 
for each others interest. 
, , , LANDMARK, 1988 
138. DESHINGKAR (Gains from the China visit. Ind Exp. 
1989, Jan, 9; 8:3. 
Investigates into Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 
China visit. Mr.Rajiv Gandhi's China visit. Mr. Rajiv 
Gandhi might have returned from his visit to China 
without a solution to the border question but he seemed 
l O J 
to have come back with peace on the border, and more. 
The v i s i t implied a departure from the past and showed 
po l i t i c a l wi l l and courage which was necessary to break 
through the pos i t ions which had hardened over some 
th i r t y years . All the top leaders in China held 
discussions with Rajiv Gandhi which was a proof of 
the i r " s incer i ty" in making a "new beginning". 
Indicates tha t the Chinese wanted Rajiv Gandhi's v i s i t 
to be a success. 
139. RAM(N). India and China: For a fresh equation 
Frontline. 6 ,1; 1989, Jan, 7-20; 4-12. 
Discusses a new development in the Indo-China 
re la t ions with the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's v i s i t 
to China in December, 1988. The v i s i t had s t a r t ed a 
fresh era of Indo-China b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . Observes 
the v i s i t as a "landmark" with the expectations of a 
way to permanent set t lement of the border i s sue . 
Contains also the photographs of Mr.Rajiv Gandhi with 
the Chinese leaders during his Beijing v i s i t . 
, , , 1988 
140. BEIJING, SMILES and hopes (Editorial). Demo World. 
18, 1; 1989, Jan,l; 3-4. 
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Argues Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing during 
Dec. 1988 as a remarkable diplomatic assignment. 
Accepts his courage and determination to go to China 
for peace as one of the most challenging efforts ever 
undertaken by any Prime Minister since the fifties. 
But, the mission achieved mixed results ranging from 
the too much hope for a quick settlement on the border 
dispute to agreements in the field of science, 
technology, aviation and culture. 
141. GUPTA (Shekhar). Sino-Indian relations: Breaking 
the ice. Ind Today. 13,24; 1988, Dec, 16-31; 46-53. 
Exposes the significance of Rajiv Gandhi's visit 
to China in December, 1988 in the context of 
Sino-Indian relations. The Sino-Indian relations which 
had remained frozen for three decades, had now started 
warming up with the bold step of Rajiv's visit. 
142. NEW FORMAT for Sino-Indian settlement (Editorial). 
Demo Wortj^ 16, 48; 1987, Nov. 29; 3-4. 
Records that Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
accepted the Chinese invitation during Nov. 1987 and 
planned to visit Beijing in the near future. Observes 
this singular development as the positive outcome of 
diplomatic meeting between the two countries. Of 
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course, it mirrors the openners of mind of the two 
countries for a peaceful settlement of Sino-Indian 
border disputes. 
, , , PEACE MISSION, 1988 
143.RAJIV GANDHI'S China mission (Editorial). Demo World. 
18,1; 1989, Jan 1; 5,7. 
Represents the Indian point of view on the New 
Year's eve peace mission of the Prime Minister had 
opened up a new vista in the Sino-Indian relations. 
Both the countries will have to show certain gestures, 
in the next few weeks, either by mutually withdrawing 
some troops from the fronties or taking certain other 
measures for confidence building. 
, , , RAPPROCHEMENT, 1988 
144. SUBRAHMANYAM (K). Towards Sino-Indian dialogue 
Mainstream. 27, 11; 1988, Dec, 10; 8-10. 
Discusses the forthcoming visit of Indian Prime 
Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing. The historic 
visit was going to thaw the frozen relationships 
between India and China and start a new phase in the 
Sino-Indian dialogue over the matters of dispute as 
well as the possibilities of mutual cooperation. 
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145. RAJAMOHAN (C). India-China summit: An agenda for 
rapprochement. Frontline. 6,1; 1989, Jan.7; 12-14. 
Exposes the outcomes of the India-China summit 
during Mr.Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China. Observes the 
visit as a "landmark" in the Sino-Indian relations. The 
warm welcome to Rajiv Gandhi at Beijing and discussions 
held with the top leaders there show a thaw in the 
bilateral relations of India and China. 
146. SINO-INDIAN thaw: Rediscovering the old myth 
(Editorial). Seminar. 8; 1989, Jan; 15-17. 
Observes the visit of Indian Prime Minister 
Mr.Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing as a significant development 
in the history of Sino-Indian relations. Expects the 
revival of friendly relations between the two countries 
which had remained frozen for decades. 
147. BOBB (Dilip). Rajiv Gandhi in China: Breaching the 
wall Ind Today. 14,1; 1989, Jan, 1; 22-29. 
Recalling the frozen relationships between India 
and China for decades observes a thaw in their 
relations with the historic visit of Indian Prime 
Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988 to Beijing. 
101) 
Characterises the visit as a vital break through in the 
Indo-China relations with expectations for the 
beginning of a new phase. 
148. MANSINGH (Surjit) and LEVINE (Steven I.). China 
and India: Moving beyond confrontation. Prob Communism. 
38,2-2; 1989, Mar-Jun; 30-49. 
Visit of India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to 
China, from December 19 to 23, 1988, marked an advance 
in the two countries' decade- long quest for a mutually 
acceptable mode of coexistence. This summit diplomacy 
represents an attempt by China and India to close the 
Chapter on 30 years of hostility and to promote a 
better atmosphere in which long-standing contentious 
issues may be peacefully resolved. 
, INDIAN SECURITY, Effects of CHINESE POLICY 
149.DUTTA (Surjit). China and the security of India. 
Stra Analysis. 12,2; 1988, May; 123-144. 
Discusses India's security invironments and 
Chinese policy towards India. The termination of 
friendly relations between India and China with the 
Chinese attack on India and the prolonged mutual 
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distrust as well as small skirmishes on the border from 
time to, time demands a great concern for India's 
safety on the Sino-Indian border. 
, , , RETROSPECTS 
150. DATTA (Anup Kiimar) and BASD (Debabrata). 
Problematique of security: Indias threat perceptions. 
Stra Analysis. 18,5; 1995, Aug; 693-707. 
Presents a retrospective analysis of the 
security question of India in the post-Cold war global 
scenario. Touches India's security horizone in the 
context of Himalayan strategic potentials and Indias 
security needs with the reference of Indian Ocean. 
Mentions the continuing crisis due to pakistan and 
nuclearisation of Pakistan. Also discusses the Chinese 
role in Indias threat perceptions. 
, , , Effects of Sino-Burmese Ties 
151. STOBDAM (P). China's forays into Buma: 
Implications for India. Stra Analysis. 16,1; 1993. Apr; 
22-36. 
Aims to at highlighting the growing Sino-Burmese 
economic and military interactions. Explains how these 
developments in India's eastern neighbourhood could 
affect its security interests and calculations, 
conclusion offers suggestions as options for India's 
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lony term strategic, as well as, economic interests. 
, , POSSIBLE THREAT from CHINA 
152. STOBDAN (P) Centeral Asia: India's strategic 
approach. Stra Analysis. 18,6; 1995, Sep; 739-52. 
End of the Cold War has given rise to new 
strategic circumstances. Emergence of Central Asia is 
one which has added a new dimension to the strategic 
environment in Southern Asia in general and India in 
particular. The strategic analysis of this 
geo-political reality in Central Asia and its 
implications for India have to be viewed in the current 
developments as well as in wider historical dimension. 
Discusses Pakistan intrigue, US approach, Russio-
Iranian nexus. Also describes in detail the possible 
threat from China and India's stand. 
, INDIAN VICE-PRESIDENT, K R. NARAYANAN VISIT, 
ADDRESSES, 1994 
153. NARAYANAN (K R). Using the past for the present. 
Mainstream 32, 51; 1994, Nov, 5; 7-10. 
During his visit to China (Oct 21-28, 1994), the 
Vice-President of India, K.R. Narayanan, delivered an 
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important address at Shanghai's Fudan University, one 
of the prestigious seats of learning in China, on 
oct.27, 1994. Contains the slightly abridged addressed 
of the Vice-President, Covering the wide spectrum of 
India-China relations. Quotes Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Rabindranath Tagore, Deng Xiaoping, Rajiv Gandhi and 
Zhou Enlai at several places and concludes after a 
saying from a confusion classic. 
, MEDIA, PRESS 
154. BARAL (J K) PANDA (Pramod) and MUNI (Nilanchal). 
Press and India-China relations. China Rep. 25,4; 1989, 
Oct-Dec; 359-73. 
Observes that the press has a better chance of 
influencing foreign policy in democratic countries. 
"The press and foreign policy is one of the least 
researched areas in international politics. The present 
work is a small attempt to contribute to a better 
understanding of this subject taking the instances from 
India press on the Indian foreign policy and 
India-China relation. Takes into consideration the news 
coverage, feature articles, editorials and varying 
(different) opinions of various Indian News papers at 
different occasions particularly Rajiv's China visit in 
I J t l 
Dec. 1988. The analysis of English dailies makes it 
that the majority of them supported Rajiv's visit to 
China While a few opposit. 
, MOLTI-DIMENSIONAL, ASSESMENT 
155. CHAKRAVARTTY (NIKHIL). Beyond our borders. Times 
Ind. 1987, Jan,4; Magazine, 4:2. 
Reviews with the start of Rajiv Gandhi's third 
year as Prime Minister; the performance so far and the 
problems India has had to face in different fields, 
both at heme and abroad, particularly urgent in the 
sphere of foreign affairs. Examines the possible lines 
of advance in relation with USA, USSR and Pakistan. 
Analyses in depth relations with China after 25 years 
since the Chinese attack in 1962. Presents a serious 
assessment of Indias overall relations with China and 
its prospects for the future, having many dimensions. 
, MOLTIPOLARITY, Effect of UNIPOLARITY 
156. ABRAHAM (Amrita). India in Chinese Plans. Ind Exp. 
1991, Dec, 9; 9:6. 
Observes that although the border continues to 
be an issue, but of more importance to Sino-Indian 
relations is their perceptions of the new geopolitical 
situation and the role each country intends to play. 
I l l 
Like India, Beijing believes a multi-polar world is 
emerging. However, it is a US-led unipolar dispensation 
and both countries are uncomfortable with this. While 
China copes with the pressures, it would like to hasten 
the emergence of multipolarity in the world and it is 
as a regional power that India fits into the Chinese 
puzzle. It recognise the primacy of India's interest in 
the region. 
, MYANMAR 
157. MALIK (J. Mohan). Sino-Indian rivalry in Myanmar: 
Implications for regional security. Con Southeast Asia. 
16,2; 1994, Sep; 137-156. 
Discusses the rivalry in Myanmar between India 
and China, reveals the possible adverse effects of the 
rivalry which might have some dangerous implications 
for regional security and tranquillity. 
, NORMALISATIONS 
158. ABHYANKAR (V M). India and China. Ind Exp. 1989. 
Jan, 17; 8:1 Letter. 
Draws attention towards the improving 
relationships between India and China. The two 
countries had entered into a fresh bilateral ties with 
1] 
the historic visit of Indian Prime Minister Mr.Rajiv 
Gandhi to Beijing. 
, , Effects of INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
159. GOPALAN (Sita). India's China policy. Stra 
Analysis. 14,2; 14.11; 1992, Mar; 1401-1413. 
Proposes to review the gamut of India's 
relations with China, in the light of Chinese Premier 
Li Peng's visit to India. Ever since the disruption of 
Sino-Indian friendship in the Fifties, barring a spell 
of full in the sixties in the aftermath of the armed 
conflict in 1962, normalisation of relations with China 
has constantly figured as the primary concern of 
India's foreign policy. Categorises Indias relations 
with China into different phases and discusses the 
major, issues which have played a vital role in India's 
relations with China. 
, PANCHSHEEL, ASSESMENT 
160. ARUN KUMAR. India, China and Panchsheel. PTI 
Feature. 13, 99; 1994, Jul, 16; PF-G41. 
Observes that through all their ups and downs, 
Panchsheel has been central to Sino-Indian relations. 
Ii3 
First, there was euphoria then a sense of hurt, folowed 
by nostalgia and now revival. Relations between the two 
major Asian powers are on the upswing today. Concludes 
that both the countries must callaborate to their 
"mutual benefit" in the ture spirit of Panchsheel, if 
they wish to play their rightful role in the world 
stage. 
, ROLE 
161. CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhil). Panchsheel and after. 
Mainstream. 32,35; 1994, Jul, 16; 17-18. 
Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence coined on June 28, 1994 having no specific 
declaration in a formal document, got wide publicity in 
excess of what the two signatories (India and China) 
could ever dream. Panchsheel got international currency 
even in the battlefields of the cold war. Mentions, the 
factor which might have contributed to the Chinese 
abandonment of the Panchsheel in relation to India. 
Concludes that in the new word order free from Cold-War 
mentality, it is but inevitable that the message of the 
panchsheel has to be revived. 
, PEACE AGREEMENT, 1988 
162. JHA (Prem Shankar). China and India: Third force 
or false. Start. Def Today. 1,1; 1993, Nov; 25-33. 
Argues how best the recent Agreement (Dec. 1988) 
between India and China can be nurtured into a lasting, 
mutually beneficial relationship. Refers to the 
five-day official visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 
December 1988. Infers that India and China have laid 
the ghost of the 1962 war to rest, and have turned 
their faces to the future. 
163. NATH (Rajendra). India-China detente. Def Today. 
1,1; 1993, Nov; 49-55. 
Observes that over three decades after the 
India-China war the two countries have signed an 
agreement which should bring tranquility and peace to 
the India-China border across the high Himalayas. 
Analyses, how has the world situaton and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union affected the two countries, what 
were the reasons which prompted India to take the 
initiative to sign the agreement and what compulsions 
forced China to look for peace with India and how will 
this pact affect China's military and economic aid to 
Pakistan. 
, , 1993 
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164. JETLY iNancy). Sino-Indian relations: old legacies 
and the new vistas. China Rep. 30,2; 1994, Apr-Jun; 
215-223. 
Discusses the need for greater cooperation 
between China and India in the light of the rapidly 
Changing global ordar. The two countries are facing 
almost common Challenges in building a new 
international and political order. Explains that the 
signing of an agreement between India and China, during 
Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao's visit to beijing in 
Sep. 1993 on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity 
along the line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border 
areas, is an important landmark in the current phase of 
improved Sino-Indian relations. Concludes that both 
the countries will have to make a conscious effort to 
rise above the legacy of the pasts and chart out a new 
path in keeping with the requirements of today. 
165. NANDA (K K). Promising new turn in Sino-Indian 
relations. Def Seminar. 3,3; 1994, Jan-Mar; 6-7. 
Examines Critically full text of the Agreement 
on the "Maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the 
line of actual control", signed between India and China 
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on 7th September 1993 at Beijing during the visit of 
the Prime Minister, Mr. P V Narasimha Rao to China. 
Describes it as certainly an impressive triumph for 
India Diplomacy. The agreement was vital because India 
and China agreed to undertake the reduction of forces 
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) etc. The 
Agreement also contains provisions to hasten the pace 
towards further normalisation. 
, POST-COLD WAR 
166. MANSINGH (Surjit). India-China relations in the 
post-Cold War era. Asian Survey^ 34, 3; 1994, Mar; 
285-300. 
Observes that relations between India and China 
have improved in the last five years and 
"normalization" of relations has been brought about by 
the efforts of both governments. Deals with the efforts 
of the joint working group, exchange of visits at high 
levels, institutional links, trade and economic 
relations, and regional impact on China-India 
relations. Concludes that the post-Cold War era 
provides less comfort than questions for the future of 
Sino-Indian relations. 
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, PROSPECTS and RETROSPECTS 
167. DUTT (P V). In retraspect and prospect. Hind 
Times. 1991, Aug, 18; Magazine, 4:1. 
Presents a retrospective view of Indo-China 
relations. The relationship between India and China has 
revolved around the pivot of the border issue. Of 
course, after a long duration of betterpast, there have 
been prospects of the betterment of their relations. 
Exchanges are taking place in the fields of science, 
technology, agriculture, sports and culture. Yet the 
border dispute continues to cast its shadow over 
India-China ties. 
, RAPPROCHEMENTS 
168. DESHNIGKAR (Giri). Unfreezing India-China ties. 
Ind Exp. 1987, Apr 28; 6:3. 
Discusses India's troubled relationship with 
China with a brief historical perspective. Observes 
that the Government of India took the opportunity of 
Mr.K.C. Pant's stop-over in Beijing on his way back 
from Pyongyang, North Korea Mr.Pant's discussions in 
Beijing might be the first step in the direction of a 
fresh initive from both sides to prevent the tension 
along the border from getting worse. The statements of 
Mr.Rajiv Gandhi on March 3, 1987 indicated a new 
attitude towards the old China problem when he spoke of 
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the need for "restraint", "Wisdom and statesmanship" in 
dealing with China and reminded that India and China 
were ancient civilizations and this fact had to be 
borne in mind in our relationship. 
169. INDIA-CHINA Thaw? (Editorial). Mainstream. 26,6; 
1987, Nov, 21; 1-3. 
Draws attention towards the latest round of 
India-China official level talks in New Delhi 
(Nov.16-18) 1987 which generated expectations in the 
country and abroad about the warming up of India-China 
relations. Leaves impression that a degree of 
earnestness is present for the removal of obstacles in 
the path of strengthening Sino-Indian relations. There 
is a sign of improvement in other fields of mutual 
relations such as trade and culture, science and 
technology too. 
170. NOHANTY (Manoranjan). India-China relations: A 
positive frame. For Aff Rep. 37,12; 1988, Dec. 
Looks into the possiblities of improving 
Sino-Indian relationships. Presents an overview of 
various fields of interaction between the two Asian 
gaints which were likely to be brought about with a new 
11^ 
trend of rapprochement easily visible after the 
historic visit of Mr.Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing. 
, , Effect of GLOBAL CHANGE 
171. RAJA MOHAN (C). China's fig leaf. Econ Times. 
1991, Dec, 10; 3:7. 
Communicates that India and China were set to 
fulminate against the new world order, hint at the 
perfidious designs of the West and the dangers of a 
unipolar world during the second week of Dec. 91 when 
Chinese Premier Mr.Li Peng made an Official visit to 
India. Presents a realistic justification for the 
Sino-Indian rhetoric on Panchsheel that with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the world is out of 
balance and that India and China must cooperate in the 
democratisation of international relations and 
resisting western hegemony. A good case for rapidly 
expanding Sino-Indian cooperation. But there is none 
for the World's largest democracy extending the fig 
leaf of Panchsheel to China. 
, , Effect of TIBET 
172. VOHRA (Sahdev). India-China rapprochment. Stra 
Analysis. 17,5; 1994, Aug; 641-646. 
Traces the historical developments over the 
border issue between India and China, which cast a 
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baneful shadow over relations between the two countries 
and hindeved any efforts at re-establishment of the 
friendly relations. However, peaceful conditions in 
Tibet may help improve the Indo-Chinese relations. 
, , Effect of UNIPOLARITY 
173. JASJIT SINGH. Future of Sino-Indian relations 
Stra Analysis. 16, 12; 1994, Mar; 1507-1518. 
Presents an assessment of the prospects of 
Sino-Indian relations in the light of a few underlying 
factors which have influenced their relations in the 
past. The relations have undergone a considerable 
change during the past eight years since the tension 
across the frontiers in Sumdurong valley in 1986-87. 
Now, the winding dawn of the Cold War has offered 
Chances for normalisation of relationships. The future 
relations are also likely to depend upon how each 
country perceives and articulates, its perceptions and 
interests related to the critical interests of the 
other. 
, , PANCHSHEEL, REVIVAL 
174. BANERJEE (D). Beacon for the future: Invoking the 
spirit of Panchsheel. Frontline. 11,16; 1994, Jul, 30-
Aug, 12; 102-103. 
IL'I 
Emphasises the need to revive the spirit of 
Panchsheel. In the era of Unipolar International order 
there is a need of Multipolarity to cope with the 
Wstern hegemony. India and China can determine the 
changing World order through improving their relations 
based upon the five principles of peaceful existence. 
175. RUIXIANG (Zheng) and MANYUAN (Dong). Developing 
friendly Sino-Indian relations on the five principles 
of peaceful coexistence. For Af f J. 12; 1989, Jun; 
64-70. 
Peeps into the prospects of Sino-Indian relation 
based on Panchsheel. Observes the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence as the only mean to achieve the 
end of friendly relations among the nations 
particularly between India and China who have remained 
hostile to each other for decades. 
, , REGIONAL SECURITY 
176. CHINA SEEKS Asian ties to counter west 
(Editorial). Econ Times.1991, Dec, 16; 2:4. 
Chinese premier Li Peng's six day-visit to India 
in the second week of Dec. 91 had been seen by US 
officials. Western diplomats and Indian academics as 
part of a broader policy in Beijing of strenthening 
1 w U 
relations with Asian countries at a time when its 
relations with the westare in the cold freeze. Reflects 
that the growing rapproachment between India and China 
represents a thaw in decades of chilly relations, a 
positive development for security in the region . 
, REGIONAL SECURITY, EFFECT of INDO-BHUTAN TIES 
177. JAIN (B M). India and Bhutan: Security and 
strategic dimensions. Stra Analysis. 18, 6; 1995, Sep; 
843-51. 
Analyses critically that the Indian diplomacy of 
providing liberal economic assistance to Bhutan on a 
massive scale has virtually paid off. strategically, 
and has benefitted Bhutan's drive for modernisation. 
Nevertheless, the key component of a sound strategic 
understanding between the tv/o countries lies in the 
stability of a better political relationship between 
India and China. The triangular relationship between 
New Delhi, Thimpu, and Beijing determines the security 
of the region, in a large measure. 
, RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS 
178. BHOLA (P L). India's China policy in the 1980s: An 
assessment. Ind J Asian Aff. 2,1; 1989, Sum (Jun); 
16-33. 
1Z3 
Mentions the parameters of India's China policy, 
the retrospect of Indo-China relations from neighbourly 
to hostile. Discusses India's China policy in detail 
influenced by border dispute and Chinese attitude 
towards India's neighbours with the improvement of 
relations in trade as well as cultural and 
technological exchanges. Presents a prognosis for 
future directions in the Indo-China relations. 
Concludes that the Indian policy makers should act in a 
manner so that both the processes the border settelment 
and the normalisation continue simultaneously. 
, SINO-INDIAN SUMMIT 
179. MATHEW (Philip). Awaiting the Summit: Position on 
border issue hardens, but cooperation in other areas 
increasing Week. 6, 24; 1986, Jun, 5-11; 16-23. 
Investigates deeply into the Sino-Indian 
relationships. Observes the mutual cooperation in the 
field of trade and economy gaining momentum whereas the 
situation on the border remains unchanged. 
, , DETENTE, 1988 
180. TAN CHUNG. Continuity in Sino-Indian ties. Times 
Ind. 1989, Jan, 4; 6:7. 
I n I 
Observes that friendship and hostility are not 
only two historical moods which characterized the 
India-China relations in the last four decades, but 
also the two alternatives which the two peoples have to 
choose to live together as neighbours. Rajiv Gandhi's 
China's elderly leader, Deng Xiaoping had succeeded in 
turning the eyes of his country from the past towards 
the future. Reveals that the two countries seemed as 
bidding farewell to the hostile approach towards each 
other and bringing a continuity to their old good 
relations. 
181. SEN (Meghanan). Deuce advantage China. Ind Exp« 
1989, Jan, 26; 8:7. 
Describes the consequences gained from the 
Sino-Indian summit during December, 1988. While 
discussing the outputs of the deliberations exclaims 
that China had got excessive advantage from the summit. 
, , SUMMIT, 1991 
182. DUTTA (Surjit). Sino-Indian summit: Commitment to 
meaningful changes? Link. 34, 19; 1991, Dec, 22; 4-5. 
Discusses the recent Sino-Indian Summit. 
Investigates into the outcome of the negotiations and 
talks. Shows the evolution of a trend towards a 
positive approach with considerable amount of 
flexibility and the commitent on each side to bring 
some reasonable changes in Sino-Indian relations. 
, , PROSPECTS, 1988 
183. SONDHI (M L). Susnoit in Beijing: Beware of the 
false dawn Statesman. 1989, Jan, 18, 6:1. 
Probes into the improving Sino-Indian relations 
from the developments in December 1988. There were over 
expectations about the output of the Sino-Indian 
Summit. Discussing the future prospects of the 
relations between the two Asian gaints, warns against 
the wider spread euphoria about the behaviour from the 
Chinese side. 
, , RAPPROCHEMENTS 
184. TAN CHUNG. India and China: Spring after winter 
chill. Statesman. 1989, Feb, 4; 6:1. 
Conveys about the improving ties as a result of 
the Sino-Indian Summit during December, 1988. Hails the 
developments as a rapproachment in the relations 
between, India and China which had remained frozen for 
decades. 
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, SINO-PAK ISSUES 
185. SEN GUPTA (Bhabani). Home and the World. Econ Pol 
Wklv. 24, 3; 1989, Jan, 21; 120-21. 
Reveals that 1989 was unlikely to see any 
dramatic improvement in India's relations with China 
and Pakistan because the prime minister might not be 
able to garner the political will. Observes weaker 
prospects of the support from party and the cooperation 
of the foreign policy bureaucracy to take bold steps 
for peace and friendship. 
, SINO-PAK TIES, Effects of GLOBAL CHANGES 
186. CHUN-CHUAN (Shen). Peking's relations with India 
and Pakistan. Issues and Studies. 25, 9; 1989, Sept; 
119-29. 
Discovers China's relations with India and 
Pakistan in the context of the Changing international 
scenario. Observes the propsects in the relations with 
Observes the prospects in the relations with some 
issues of past and some new ones emerging from the 
global transformations. 
1Z7 
, SINO-SOVIET BORDER TALKS, IMPLICATIONS for INDIA 
187.MUKHERJEE (Dilip). Sino-Soviet border talks: 
Pointers for India. Temes Ind. 1987, Sep, 8; 6:3. 
Analyses the negotiations between Soviet Union 
and China over the Sino-Soviet border talks with those 
of Sino-Indian. Presents some indications for India to 
draw inference from the Sino-Soviet border talks. The 
lesson to draw from Soviet experience is that 
improvements in the overall relationship will have to 
come first. Argues that in the Sino-Indian case, this 
requires an effrot by each side to convince the other 
that it is not ganging up against the other. 
, SINO-SOVIET DETENTE, IMPLICATIONS for INDIA 
188. MALHOTRA (Inder). Delhi, Moscow and Beijing Times 
Ind. 1989, Jun, 1; 6:3. 
Comments on the renewed friendship between 
Soviet Union and China, once bitterly estranged 
comrades and the Indian reaction over it. Observes, one 
can not claim that the new equation between the 
Soviet-Union and China was being viewed by all Indian 
Observers objectively or that the perceptions were not 
being clouded by pre-conceived notions. Concludes that 
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a lot of changes combined iwth a great deal of 
continuity could be expected in Indias relations with 
both the Soviet Union and China. 
, SOVIET PREMIER, GORBACHEV VISIT, CHINA, INDIAN 
PERCEPTIONS 
189. MALHOTRA (Inder). Gorbachev visit to China: A view 
from India. Mainstream. 27, 37; 1989, June, 10-12. 
Represents the Indian perception on the 
Gorbachev's historic visit to Beijing in the coatext of 
national as well as international interest. Two extreme 
views, oneborn of paranoia and the other of wishful 
thinking are reflected and the complex reality lies 
somewhere between the two. Concludes, as a first step 
towards the desired goal of triangular cooperation, 
India, the Soviet Union and China should formally 
sponsor Gorbachev's proposal at Turtle Bay. 
, STALEMATE 
190. SEN GUPTA (Bhabani). New turn in Sino-Indian ties. 
Hind Times 1987, Apr, 24; 9: 3. 
Examines critically the report of Ravi Rikhey, a 
responsible military critic, in the Times of India of 
16th April predicting a Chinese attack across the Mc 
I2n 
Mohan Line in the summer. Comments that the report had 
sported a fietional portrait of the next war between 
India and China. Strongly disagrees with Rikhey's 
alarming piece on China and the excursions into 
alarmist possibility. Asserts that the stagnation of a 
stalemete in the India-China relations would not 
continue for much longer as it would be broken either 
by violence or by mutual negotiations and upgrading the 
relationship. 
, STRAINED, 1981-90 
191. DAFTARI (Maryam). Sino-Indian relations and 
encounters: Challenges and opportunities in the 
ninties. China Rep. 30,3; 1994, Jul-Sep, 283-293. 
Surveys the Sino-Indian relations over nineties. 
Comments on the ups and downs in the bilateral 
relations between the two countries through the 
decades. The relations had been strained due to the 
incidents at Sumdurong valley in 1987. Both the 
countries faced a new thrust due to internal changes 
and external transformations taking place at the global 
level combined with the favourable conditions for 
cooperation in several areas. 
1 3 f) 
, SUSPICIOUS 
192. LURKING DANGER (Editorial). Ind Exp. 1989, Jan, 
19; 8:1. 
Investigates into the developments in 
Sino-Indian relations in a positive direction. But, the 
hostility prevailing for decades had not come to an 
end. The behaviour of Chinese still remained full of 
suspicion as far as the border is concerned. The 
positive developments should not put anyone into 
euphoria because danger is hidden on the border. 
, TERRITORIAL and PERCEPTUAL PROBLEMS, Effects of 
GLOBAL CHANGES 
193. SALAHUDDIN AHMAD (Abu Taher). Sino-Indian 
relations: Problems. Progress and prospects. Biiss J. 
15,4; 1994, Jan-Mar; 355-322. 
Reviews perceptual and territorial problems 
between China and India. Examins the basic factors for 
normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Impact of 
global changes on the relation is assessed and the 
progress in biliteral relations reviewed. Concludes 
with the prospects of Sino-Indian relations with some 
observations. 
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, TRADE DIPLOMACY, 1991 
194. DEAR (M K). Li visit to boost trade. Hind Times. 
1991, Dec, 9; 1:2. 
Explores that Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's 
visit to India from Dec. 11 was expec. ed to result in 
arrangements to improve the Sino-Indian economic 
relations including trade and to begin a cooperation in 
the fields of science and technology and space. 
Discusses the various factors of bilateral trade and 
new possibilities between India and China in this 
field. 
, TRANSFORMATIONS 
195. SINGH (S P). Checkers. Hind Times. 1987, Apr, 19; 
9:1. 
Reveales that when the eighth round of talks 
with the Chinese over the border dispute was round the 
corner, it was about time, to take a look, at the way 
the scene had changed since the border conflict of a 
quarter century ago. Observes that the Chinese 
attitudes had partly been influence by a history of 
border disputes of which the Mc Mahon Line is just 
another instance. 
'I "^  
, , PROSPECTS, Effects of POST-COLD WAR 
SITUATIONS 
196. DUTTA (Surjit). India-China relations in the 
post-Cold War ear Stara Analysis. 16, 11; 1994, Feb; 
1411-1430. 
Surveys the post-Cold War situations and admits 
that India and China have begun a significant 
transformation of their relations and created propsect, 
of for reaching impact on the continental as well as 
global level. In the International system, India and 
China are less recognised in terms of their capability, 
due to less developed industries and technologies. 
Huge populations and diverse social and technologies. 
Huge populations and diverse social and cultural 
compositions too, are the challenges commonly faced by 
the two and they need to cooperate bilaterally and with 
others in similar conditions to reduce the challenges 
and increase the opportunities for their prosperity in 
a stable and peaceful global and domestic climate. 
INDO-CHINA RELATIONS, UNITED STATES, INFLUENCES, 
IMPROVEMENTS 
197. DHAR (M K). US for better Sino-Indian ties. Hind 
Times. 1991, Nov, 25; 12: 4. 
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The United States had conveyed to India about 
its optimism over the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's 
New Delhi visit from Dec, 1991. It observes an 
excellent opportunity for improving Sino-Indian 
relations and the security environment in South Asia 
and also resolving pending bilateral matters. The 
United States also expressed its desire to support and 
see the real improvements in Sino-Indian relations 
taking place. 
, VULNERABILITIES, INDIA and CHINA 
198. JOSHI (Manoj). Vulnerable partners. Econ Times. 
1991, Dec, 12; 10:7. 
Exposes that as large, populous, multi-ethnic 
and developing countries, India and China share a 
number of vulnerabilities. Any Sino-Indian policy of 
exacerbating each other's weakness can only be 
self-defeating and provide others the advantage. 
Bothsides have variously felt vulnerable and the 
consequences of this have been the fulcrum of 
Sino-Indian relations in the past generation. FINDS 
THAT TODAY, DESPITE CHANGES, THE Chinese do not quite 
appear ready to settle the Sino-Indian border interms 
of the Zhou offer of 1960. 
, WAR, REALISTIC VIEW, APPRAISAL , 1962-1987 
199.MALHOTRA (Inder). India-China War: 25 years after. 
Mainstream 26,4; 1987, Nov, 7; 19-21. 
Reviews the developments after Indo-China war 
till 1987. A bulk of literature produced on the subject 
was thicker than the hail of bullets during one month 
fighting. Investigates the causes of thewar and a more 
realistic view is taken in the 25- years perspective. 
, , RETROSPECTS, 1962 
200. MALHOTRA (Inder). 1962. War in retrospect. Hind 
Times. 1987, Oct, 20; 11:3. 
Traces the retraspects of the 1962 war in which 
China had launched a massive invasion on India in both 
Ladakh and NEFA region and occupied a large part of 
Indian teritory. Discusses the causes behind the Indian 
defeat as lack of proper advice, prevailing euphorism, 
great blunders on the part of the Indian Commanders. 
Also mentions and analyses the recent flare-up of 
tension along the India-China border in Arunachal 
Pradesh. 
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, REVIEW, 1962 
201. MALHOTRA (Inder). Revealing light on 1962 
War.Times Ind. 1991, Nov, 15; 6:3. 
Reviews the war of 1962. Mentions that even at 
that distance of time any reference to the brief but 
brutal border war with China in 1962 touches a raw 
nerve because the month-long fighting on bleak 
Himalayan heights, such as it was, had quickly turned 
into a traumatic combination of a military debacle and 
a political disaster. Expresses concern over 
governments refusal to provide any document which might 
reveal the real situation. But, Major - General (retd.) 
D.K. Patils book provides an insight into the situation 
of Crisis in the Indian Army. 
, , ROLE OF SIKHS, 1962 
202. DEOL (Gurdev Singh). Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962 
and the Sikhs. Sikh Review. 38, 12; 1990, Dec; 44-48. 
Discusses the role of Sikhs during the 
Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962. Individual acts of 
valour, supreme sacrifice and leadership were shown by 
the brave men of Punjab Regiment. Contributions of the 
Ninth Punjab Battalion are also acknowledged. Battle of 
Walong, Battle of Turin Peaks and Battle of Chushul in 
Ladakh are also mentioned. 
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